More...
Torulagha 1
Torulagha 2
Torulagha 3
Torulagha 4
Torulagha 5
Torulagha 6
Torulagha 7
Torulagha 8
Torulagha 9
Torulagha 10
Torulagha 11
Torulagha 12
Torulagha 13
Torulagha 14
Torulagha 15
Torulagha 16
Torulagha 17
Torulagha 18
Torulagha 19
Torulagha 20
Torulagha 21
Torulagha 22
Torulagha 23 |
 |
The
Congressional Black Caucus releases paper "Breaking the Oil Syndrome:
Responsible Hydrocarbon Development in West Africa" on Tuesday, July 19, 2005.
.....More > |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Priye S. Torulagha
A
Treatise on War: Achieving Military Victory in the Modern
Era
|
|
Introduction: Problem Statement
War
is as old as human civilization. At some level, it is regarded as an extension
of politics. At another level, it is viewed as politics by other means. There is
also the view that war is a failure of politics. In any case, war takes place
when political intercourse fails to resolve a misunderstanding or a dispute
among nation-states, people or communities. It is an instrument for the
acquisition of power, for drastically changing the status quo, for survival, and
for destruction. Sometimes, it is extremely very destructive and at other times,
not so destructive. War is caused by many factors including (1) the desire for
territory, (2) nationalism, (3) the desire for independence, (4) economics, (5)
ideological differences, (6) psychological tendencies, (7) ethnic and religious
differences, (8) domestic politics, (9) misperceptions, and (10) the structure
of the international system (Duncan, Webster, & Switky, 2004,
pp.346-353).
Basically, strategies and tactics of war have not changed
that much, even though the power to defeat and the power to hurt have changed
(Rourke & Boyer, 1996, p. 309). Strategies and tactics that were used by the
ancient warriors and fighters, including the Egyptians, Babylonians, Israelites,
Persians, Macedonians, Romans, Mongolians, Chinese, Mayans, Incans, Zulus etc.
are still of much use in the modern era. Quite often, new strategies and tactics
are added to the existing ones in an incremental manner. As a result, military
methods deployed by Alexander the Great, Cyrus the Great, Hannibal, Genghis
Khan, Attila the Hun, King Chaka Zulu etc. are still being studied by
contemporary military authorities and passed unto officer cadets in military
training institutions. Hence, Alexander the Great, Hannibal, Attila the Hun,
Emperor Napoleon etc. are still considered to be some of the best military
generals that have ever lived. It is, therefore, not surprising that the
writings of the Chinese military genius, Sun Tzu, concerning The Art of War ,
still stands as the best theoretical endeavor on strategy and tactics on war.
Likewise, the writings of Chairman Mao Tse Tung (Simonsen & Spindlove, 2000,
p. 99) stand out as a classic discourse on the conduct of guerrilla warfare.
While strategies and tactics of war have not changed to any remarkable
degree, the weapons of war and the concept of military victory have changed
greatly. The weapons of war have undergone gargantuan transformations due to
scientific and technological advancement. In the distant and not too distant
past, warriors, fighters, and soldiers fought with swords, spears, bows and
arrows, catapults, and later canons. They matched on foot, rode horses and
wagons (chariots), and row boats, At the early part of the 21st century,
warriors, fighters, and soldiers now fight with automatic rifles, machine guns,
rocket propelled grenades, grenades, smart bombs, jet-fighters, bombers,
spy-planes, long-range artillery batteries, missiles, laser-beams,
raider-guided, engine-propelled destroyers, frigates, carriers, submarines, and
biochemical weapons. In the past, enemies had to confront each other
face-to-face during combat, but in today's world, enemies do not have to see
each other before firing missiles hundreds of miles away at each other. In
addition, some of the most advanced nation-states (U.S., Russia, China, Britain,
France, India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea etc) have nuclear weapons. Nuclear
weapons have the capacity to destroy the entire world many times
over.
The other facet of war that has changed tremendously is the notion
of military victory. Military victory is an ability of a force or a nation-state
to overwhelm another force or nation-state through military confrontation, in
such a manner as to defeat and impose its will on the defeated force. For
instance, ancient Egypt became a power by systematically defeating and imposing
its will on other political entities. In the process, it became a very dominant
military and political power in the region for centuries. All the empires that
have ever existed did so on the basis of overwhelmingly defeating their
opponents in military confrontations and compelling the defeated entities to
become their political, military, and economic subjects and
appendages.
In the past, it appeared that the notion of military victory
or defeat was very clear and decisive. Military victory was generally
characterized by a decisive victory and or a decisive defeat. A typical war
characterized by a total victory was the total defeat of the Canaanites by the
Israelites, thereby, resulting in the total annihilation of the Canaanites. In
fact, up to the end of the 2nd World War, it seemed that a substantial number of
the wars were characterized by either total victories or total defeats. However,
this does not imply that there were no indecisive results following military
confrontations. For example, the long-drawn out Peloponnesian War of 431 B.C.,
between the Athenian empire and the Spartan League dragged on for more than
eight years ( Wallbank, Taylor, & Bailey 1976, pp. 105-106) . Likewise, the
Christians and the Muslims fought series of Crusades which ended indecisively,
hence, resulting in a "truce that left the Muslims controlling the Holy Lands,
with Christians free to visit their shrines" (Simonsen & Spindlove, 2000,
P.67). It can also be noted that battles between the British and the Zulus were
characterized by successes and failures on both sides until the British finally
won and imposed British control of the South African region. The same could be
said of the battles between the British and the Boers. Likewise, in some cases,
military victories were achieved at a very substantial cost, hence, the coinage
"Pyrrhic Victory." Despite the exceptions, it can be stated that a total
military victory was much more pronounced in the past than today. For example,
European political and economic ascendancy in the world today can be attributed
to the total military victories achieved by them during the colonial period
(1492 - 1960s)... Starting from the Spanish conquest of the Americas, after
Christopher Columbus had reached the new world, subsequent European powers,
including Portugal, Britain, France, Germany, Holland, Belgium, Norway, Denmark
etc. followed by conquering various parts of the world.
Having conquered
most of Asia, all of Africa, the Americas, and the Middle East, they imposed
their will through colonization. It is evidently clear that the Christianized
countries in Africa, Asia, Middle East, and the Americas were colonized by
Judeo-Christian Europeans. Likewise, it is evident that all the Islamized
countries in the world today were overwhelmingly conquered and colonized by
Islamic forces during the periods of Islamic expansion or imperialism. Most of
the Islamized countries were later conquered by the European powers. Hence,
Pakistan, Indonesia, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Jordan,
Morocco, Libya, Algeria, Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, Iraq, Oman,
Bahrain, Northern Nigeria, etc. are states that have undergone multiple
conquests by superior military powers.
Total military victories were
quite possible and easily achievable in the past due to the concentration of the
technology of war in fewer nations, the ability to produce arms, and the ability
to reinforce positions. In other words, Western total defeat and colonization of
Africa, Asia, the Americas, and the Middle East were possible due to their
maximization of power in all its dimensions. On the other hand, most indigenous
entities in Africa, Asia, the Americas, and the Middle East were still using
antiquated weapons that were no match for the modernized arms possessed by the
Europeans. It is clear that the Africans, Native Americans, Asians etc. relied
on bows and arrows, spears, machetes, catapult and other less efficient arms to
confront the Europeans. On the other hand, the Europeans used guns, boat-mounted
canons of high velocity, swords, spears. Etc. Thus, their combinations of arms
and personnel were far more superior in quality compared those of the indigenous
people. The Europeans were able to produce, resupply, and reinforce their forces
much better and faster than the indigenous forces. Inevitably, in almost every
confrontation, the Europeans won outright. Only in few cases, were they
restrained from achieving total victory. The Europeans augmented their military
efforts with diplomatic trickery to hoodwink, divide, and conquer, even much
larger forces, like in Mexico, Peru, Zululand, China, Nigeria etc. They also had
the strategic intentions of dominating and colonizing while the indigenous
people did not, apart from fighting to protect their territories and traditional
ways.
Industrialization and modernization in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries increased the lopsided advantage in favor of the powers that possessed
technology. For example, the 2nd World War World came partially as a result of
German successful technological modernization and rearmament program in the
1930s. Having lost the First World War in 1918, the Germans covertly rearmed,
utilizing updated scientific and technological knowledge to successfully
modernize their weaponry. On the other hand, the victorious European powers in
the First World War were not motivated to rearm and modernize their armed
forces, after their victory over Germany. They felt secured, having defeated and
imposed their will on Germany and other defeated powers. The exception was
Japan. It continued to rearm and modernize its armaments immediately after the
First World War. It was motivated to do so due to a desire to control the
pacific region of the world. It knew immediately after defeating Russia in
1904-05 that it had to become a great power if it needed to control and impose
its will on the Asian and pacific regions.
Having successfully modernized
and rearmed, Germany, under Adolf Hitler, felt very confident of defeating any
military power that attempted to impede its strategic goal of controlling
Europe. Like the indigenous people of Africa, Asia, the Americas, and the Middle
East in the fifteen and later centuries, the victorious powers in the First
World War, particularly Britain and France, were no match for Germany when it
unleashed its blitzkrieg tactics, using ground and air forces simultaneously to
overwhelmed Polish, Norwegian, Danish, Czechoslovakian, Dutch, Belgian, British,
and French forces during the early stages of the 2nd. World Ward. Germany was
technologically so superior that without its military misadventure into the
Soviet Union and the involvement of United States, it would have won the Second
World War outright. Due to the technological advancement of German weaponry, the
Allied Forces (US, Russia, Britain etc.) had to scramble to catch up
technologically with Germany. The same could be said of Japan. No country in the
Asian/Pacific region was able to militarily contain or impede Japanese military
successes. Consequently, it was able to impose its will throughout the region,
including China, Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines etc. Again,
the United States had to intervene, especially after the Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor, Hawaii on December 7, 1941, in order to stop Japan from totally
controlling the Pacific region of the world. Toward the end of the 2nd. World
war, even the US was afraid of directly confronting Japan in the Japanese
heartland. As a result, it dropped atomic bombs on Nagasaki and Hiroshima to
abruptly end the 2nd World War.
It appears that the idea of a total
military victory began to dissipate or wane after the 2nd. World War. After the
war to end all wars, it became increasingly difficult to achieve a total
military victory in any major military confrontation. The concept of victory
came to be characterized more by indecisive outcomes and pyrrhic victories. The
first major test case of a war not ending in a clear and decisive manner was the
Korean War which began in 1950 and ended in 1955. Despite the involvement of the
two largest armies in the world ( United States and China), the war ended in a
quagmire, hence, fifty years after the Korean War, the war has not really ended.
U.S. forces are still stationed in South Korea to keep the
peace.
Purpose of this article
The Purpose of this
article is to (1) demonstrate that the notion of a total military victory is
becoming increasingly unattainable, (2) show that it is increasingly futile to
determine when a country has won or lost a war since victory is in the eye of
the beholder, (3) show that nation-states are losing the ability to exercise
ultimate sovereignty over their territories due to the equalization of the
production of armaments and the democratization of the use of arms (4) prove
that these developments came as a result of the Cold War, and (5) demonstrate
that national political leaders need to rely more on communication rather than
on the threat of the use of force to enforce compliance if they do not want to
tear their countries apart.
Theoretical Predications
1.
The idea of a total military victory is no longer very clear in the modern era
due to the growth of military technology, the global spread of military
weaponry, and the militarization of a large section of the world population.. As
a result, no country or state can be sure of winning a war decisively in the
modern era.
2. There is no such thing as a superior intelligence
gathering capability, despite technological advantage. The most elemental
ingredient of intelligence gathering is the gathering of critical information.
Anyone can lie, manipulate, misinform, and disinform, regardless of the level of
technological sophistication.
3 .States are gradually losing the ability
to exercise sovereignty over their territories and natural resources due to the
ease with which any dissatisfied group can militantly oppose state's rights to
do so.
4. It is increasingly pyrrhic to win a war militarily due to the
cost of maintaining and sustaining the occupation after victory.
5.
Sovereign states and conventional forces are being disadvantaged by the
increasing growth and use of unconventional tactics by irregular
forces.
6 .Military victory is becoming very difficult to achieve as the
technological gap between the industrialized and the developing world
dwindles.
7 .Due to an increasing technological capability on the part of
many countries, there is no more regional monopoly on the production of weapons
of war. Consequently, whenever a new weapon of war comes into the limelight,
there is a scramble by other states to catch up with the technology. This drives
up the arms race and increase the level of insecurity.
8. Biochemical
weaponry is equalizing the balance of military threat in the world.
9.
The universalization of military strategies and tactics during the Cold War has
made it increasingly impossible for any nation-state to claim supremacy in the
application of military strategies and tactics of war.
10. The Cold War
contributed immensely to the growth of ideologically driven non-governmental and
non-territorial forces that are much more difficult to defeat by nation-states
and conventional forces.
11. Some unconventional forces are developing
both conventional and unconventional military capabilities and becoming a
greater threat to national forces
12. Military conflict in tribalized,
ethnicized, and communalized societies tends to be much more complicated than in
non-communalized societies. As a result, achieving military victory in such
societies can be very tasking.
13. Preemptive strike, as a defensive
strategy in today's world, is like stirring the hornets nest or opening a can of
worms with very unpredictable consequences. The reason being that many states
have developed the capability to strike back in many subtle ways and still deny
ever being responsible.
Reasons for the Change in the concept of
Military Victory
The Cold War (1945-1990) is greatly responsible for
the dramatic change in the characterization of military victory. The Cold War
came about because war-time allies - the US and the Soviet Union, felt apart due
to ideological reasons. The Soviet Union represented Communism and the United
States represented Capitalism. The Soviet Union intended to spread Communism and
the United States doggedly opposed the spreading of Communism. This led to the
division of the world into two ideological spheres - the East and the West.
Basically, the Soviet Union and its allies represented the Eastern sphere and
the United States and its allies represented the Western spheres and both
balanced each other.
Since the two could not agree ideologically, the
conflict between the two came to be called a Cold War. However, they could not
fight each other directly since both possessed nuclear weapons, so, they fought
the war using proxies and fifth columnists. The Soviet Union, in an effort to
internationalize Communism, supported anti-colonial and anti-western struggles
by arming, training, and supporting liberation movements that threatened Western
interests. On the other hand, the United States thwarted the spread of Communism
by instituting a Containment Policy. Under the Containment Policy, the US
supported any Western interest that was threatened by Communist or revolutionary
forces. The two superpowers recruited, trained, financed, armed, and encouraged
both conventional and unconventional forces to fight in an effort to contain
each other. Therefore, the Korean, Algerian, Vietnamese, Hungarian,
Czechoslovakian, Cambodian, Angolan, Mozambican, Colombian, Nicaraguan, El
Salvadoran, Argentine, Chilean, Palestinian, Ethiopian, Indonesian, Peruvian,
Afghan etc. conflicts were Cold War conflicts because they were engineered,
sponsored and managed by the two superpowers and their allies.
In order
to fight these ideologically motivated wars, the two superpowers also spread the
technology of war by manufacturing and selling arms. During the 40 to 45-year
period of the Cold War, millions of people were trained in some kind of combat
activity. The unforeseen and indirect effect of the massive militarization,
especially, of the developing world, led to a gradual equalization of military
capability. In other words, in every country today, there are thousands, if not
millions, who have military experience and can conveniently use arms to fight.
Likewise, arms are plentiful and can easily be supplied by arms dealers who
became very proficient at supplying contraband weaponry during the Cold War.
Many countries today are manufacturing arms and selling them for foreign
exchange purposes.
In practical terms, it can be hypothesized that there
is no more military superpower in the world, even though the United States and
Russia are technically regarded as military superpowers. This means that no
country can claim a monopoly of military power, regardless of its technological
advancement and military capability. Likewise, it is also increasingly very
difficult for nation-states to freely exercise sovereignty over their
territories. A group within any nation-state can rise up in arms and challenge
the national forces to a duel in which the national forces might find it
exceedingly difficult to win.
The following factors are greatly
accountable for the changes that have taken place concerning war since the
beginning of the Cold War.
1. Total Military Victory: The concept
of a total military victory began to dissipate during the Cold War. The two
superpowers armed, sold, trained, and spread armaments, thereby making it very
difficult for any nation to win war very easily without military and political
complications. The following developments: (a) spread of arms, (b) the attempt
to control the internal situation through covert means, (c) the desire to
possess advance military weaponry, (d) the desire for quick military victories,
and (e) pyrrhic victories, are some of the reasons why a total military victory
is almost impossible in modern warfare.
a. Spread of Arms: A total
military victory is no longer possible, in conventional terms, because the
control of military weaponry and the ability to fight both conventionally and
unconventionally is no longer the prerogative of military superpowers and
sovereign nation-states. Many racial, ethnic, religious, and political groups
now have the ability to manufacture, supply, and buy arms in the world market to
pursue their political goals and objectives.
As indicated above, the two
superpowers and their allies, during the Cold War, trained, equipped, sponsored,
and financed both conventional and unconventional forces in various parts of the
world in an effort to enhance their strategic goals and objectives. Goldstein
(2004, p. 29) noted:
| " the rest of the world became contested terrain
where each bloc tried to gain allies or influence, often by sponsoring opposing
sides in regional and civil wars" |
Consequently, a
considerable number of people in the world are well trained in the art of modern
combat. Likewise, during the Cold War, the two superpowers and their allies
encouraged the proliferation of armaments through the sell of arms to countries
and clandestine groups. Rourke & Boyer (1996, p.298) noted:
"The arms that flowed in the world came largely
from the economically developed countries. Of all arms exported during the last
half of the 1980s, the Soviet Union was the largest supplier, accounting for
36.8 percent of transfers, and the United States was a close second with 32.6 of
the transfers"
The two authors ( Ibid.) further noted that:
"Of the
total $490.1 billion in world arms exports during the 1980s, 77.5 percent went
to LDCs. Of these countries during the decade, Iraq was by far the largest arms
importer (52.0 billion), followed by Saudi Arabia (37.4 billion), India (23.6
billion), Syria (21.3 billion), Iran (16.6 billion), Vietnam (16.3 billion),and
Afghanistan ($12.8 billion)." |
In the process, they
saturated the world with arms. For example, the Soviet Union and its allies sold
arms to the National Liberation Front in Algeria, the North Vietnamese Forces,
the Fidel Castro government in Cuba, India, North Korea, China, the Popular
Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the Palestinian Liberation
Organization, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Libya, Somali, Ethiopia, the African National
Congress in South Africa, the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, the El Salvador National
Liberation Front, etc. In turn, the United States sold and sponsored military
forces in South Vietnam, El Salvador, Argentina, Chile, Zaire, Columbia, Iran
under the Shah, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Turkey, Indonesia, Iraq, Taiwan,
Philippines, Pakistan etc and the Contras in Nicaragua, the Taliban, the Al
Qaeda, the Northern Alliance, and multitudes of anticommunist and rightist
forces in the world. Today, India, Pakistan, Brazil, Israel, North Korea, China,
Syria, Iran, and Chile are capable of producing and selling arms, just as the
United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Holland,
Norway etc.
b. The attempt to Control the Internal Situation through
Covert Means: Quite often, states attempt to solve internal political problems
by manipulating, threatening, bribing, cultivating clandestine fighting forces,
death squads, security forces, and spies. In the process, they help to train a
vast number of their populations in military and security tactics that often
backfire against them. Quite often, a disgruntled element or elements among the
covertly trained fighters would rebel and launch attacks against the state to
the consternation of the political leaders who made the decision to create such
covert forces. For example, in ancient times, the Roman Empire exploited the
Goths who were fleeing their homelands as the Huns threatened them. Rome
recruited and made them to fight to protect the empire from invading forces and
yet refused to grant them political and economic rights in the fourth century.
The Goths rebelled and launched attacks against the empire (Wallbank, Taylor
& Bailey, p. 217). In recent times, the British trained many Kenyans to
fight in the 2nd. World War. In returning to Kenya at the end of the war, some
of the veterans formed the Mau Mau movement and fought against British control
of Kenya (Simonsen & Spindlove, 2000, p. 205). The Katanga Rebels, for
example, were sponsored by Western economic interests in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo to destabilize the government of Patrice Lumumba. The rebels later
launched series of attacks against the government of President Mobutu Sese Seko
and those economic interests that had originally sponsored them. Nigeria, during
various military regimes, relied to a great extent on special security forces
and spies to control and manipulate the population. Tired of the intimidation
and threats generated by these kinds of state tactics, some of the former
soldiers began to help institute ethnic militias to fight back. Today, almost
every ethnic group has a militia capable of challenging the established military
forces (Singer, 2001, March 14). Now, Nigerian leaders are puzzled by the sudden
growth of ethnic militias, forgetful of the fact that they planted the seeds and
nourished their germination.
The most recent case of rebellion involved
elements of the Philippine army. In July of 2003, some troops rebelled and
called for the resignation of the president. During the rebellion, the troops
alleged that some of the so-called "terrorists" incidents which took place in
the country and were attributed to have been committed by Islamic militants were
actually perpetrated by the Philippine government (Roberts, 2003, July 27). The
rebellion was resolved through political negotiations between the government and
the rebellious troops.
c. Possession of Advance Military Weaponry: Even
the possession of an advanced military technology does not necessarily guarantee
a total military victory in the modern era. The reason being that the more a
country relies on advanced technological weaponry, the more it spends in
maintaining, supporting, and fighting any war. Advanced weapon systems require
an extensive network of support personnel. This means that a country with
advanced weapons systems cannot fight a war without involving a large number of
its military and support personnel. This automatically adds to the cost of
fighting a war. For example, the First Persian Gulf War (1991) cost $61 billion,
even though the actual fighting lasted for a very short duration. The 2nd
Persian Gulf War (Iraqi War of 2003) is going to cost more than $100 billion
even though the actual fighting lasted for about three or four months. In 1991,
the US only spent $7 billion because other countries contributed financially. In
the Iraqi war (2nd Persian Gulf), since it was a unilateral action, the US is
bearing most of the cost and many countries are not too eager to participate
financially towards the reconstruction effort (Byrd, 2003, September 29).
Worried by the continuing instability and the increasing financial cost
of trying to stabilize the situation in Iraq, the US now wants the United
Nations and other countries to support the stabilization and reconstruction
effort. It is hurriedly training new Iraqi police and armed forces and hoping to
leave the country by June 2004. If coalition forces, led by the world's most
technologically advanced military power, are unable to contain the situation
now, it is very doubtful as to the capability of a hurriedly trained Iraqi
forces to be able to control the situation later. It is quite possible for the
country to degenerate into a kind of Afghanistan, Somalia or Algeria where
ethnic, religious, and political groups battle it out for control of the
country. Already, the Shiites, Kurds, and the Sunnis are strategizing and
preparing for an all out interethnic struggle for the control of Iraq, after the
US leaves. Two suicide bombings on February 1st, 2004, killed prominent members
of the Kurdish political and military establishment in Northern Iraq.
d.
Quick Military Victories: Due to the cost of maintaining and operating advanced
weapon systems, nations with such weapons tend to look for quick military
victories in war situations because they cannot afford to fight a prolonged war.
By looking for quick military victories, they often enable their less powerful
opponents to intentionally adopt delay tactics in order to frustrate the
process. The United State got frustrated when the Vietnam War dragged on for so
long. The Vietnamese knew that the US could not fight a prolonged war because of
the financial cost and possible political fall out from home. The Soviet Union
experienced frustration in Afghanistan because the war dragged on for almost
eleven years, thereby draining the Soviet economy and creating doubt in the
minds of the military establishment. Just as in Vietnam, the Soviets had to
withdraw from Afghanistan.
On the other hand, it appears that less
technologically advanced countries and societies tend to have a greater capacity
to fight a prolonged war. The Afghans, Angolans, Mozambicans, Lebanese,
Cambodians, Vietnamese, Liberians, Ethiopians, Eritreans, Algerians, Sri
Lankans, Pakistanis, Indians etc. have been able to fight incessantly for a long
time. One of the reasons why less developed countries and societies have a
greater capacity to do so is due to the fact that their economies and the
military are not as tightly interconnected as in the advanced countries. As a
result, they are not as energy-dependent, computer-oriented, and industrialized.
People in these countries are able to live without electricity, walk bare-foot
if necessary, and not dependent on machines as those in the industrially
advanced countries. Obviously, in war situations, they can endure tremendous
suffering and continue the war. Since the 1960s, the African continent has been
subjected to very bloody civil wars, some of them lasting for more than twenty
years. The African people are able to survive and rebuilt because they are not
dependent on high-tech to solve their problems. A country with massive high-tech
weaponry can easily collapse on the weight of the debt that would be incurred
for fighting a war for more than twenty years.
e. The Easy or Good Life
Syndrome: It can also be said that the more technologically and economically
advanced a country or a society is, the softer the citizens become as a result
of living the "easy or good life." On the other hand, the less technologically
and economically advanced a country or a society is, the more rugged the
citizens are. In war, the rugged and the desperate are more likely to fight
ferociously than those who live the easy or good life. History has many
examples, hence, the great empires have always been annihilated by the desperate
and the rugged 'Barbarians." For example, the Israelis were more rugged and
willing to take on much larger Arab forces because they desperately needed a
state of their own in the 1940s. Now that Israel has been established and the
citizens are now enjoying some of the "easy or good life", the Israeli political
and military establishments are beginning to make mistakes in their military
calculations. On the other hand, as the Palestinians become very desperate to
achieve statehood, they are becoming much more daring in their military tactics,
so much so that an increasing number of young women are joining the suicide
squads. The Afghan people have always been very rugged. Most African ethnic
groups are militarily very rugged due to the warrior traditions.
f.
Pyrrhic Victories: Quick military victories tend to end in pyrrhic victories, in
the long run. The reason being that in an attempt to quickly crush the opponent,
not enough time is devoted to analyzing the intentions and tactics of the
opponent. For example, South African forces used to attack the Angolan, African
National Congress, and the Southwest African Peoples Organization forces with
all their technological might in an effort to crush them quickly and achieve
total victory. In doing so, they failed to realize that the ANC, the MPLA, and
SWAPO were in the struggle for the long run. The three groups planned their
strategies and tactics to carry them through decades of war. Due to the failure
of the South African forces to study the tactics of the aforementioned forces,
their soldiers later became frustrated as each successive military operation did
not end in total defeat for the opponents. The three forces were able to always
come back from the brink of defeat and counter the offensives.
The US, it
appears, fought the war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda with a desire for quick
military victory. Hence, the war proceeded very fast, resulting in the defeat of
the two. However, many Taliban and Al Qaeda elements escaped and were not
caught. Since victory was achieved very quickly, many gaps were left. Now, the
escaped elements of the two forces are reinforcing and reentering the country to
continue the war. Consequently, it is not proper to say that the Afghan war has
ended. Since the official declaration of an end to the war, the Afghan
government of President Ahmid Karzai has not been able to extend the reach of
the government beyond Kabul. The war lords that changed sides to make the
Northern Alliance victory possible now seem to be changing sides
again.
Iraq represents the clearest evidence of the weakness of a war
strategy based on quick victory. The US and Britain quickly overwhelmed the
Iraqi conventional forces by overrunning the country during the 2nd Persian Gulf
War. However, in doing so, they allowed trained Iraqi soldiers to disappear into
the unknown, without capturing them. Thus, there are at least half a million
Iraqi former soldiers who have now mingled with the civilian population. Some of
them have probably given up the military life, some have become guerrilla
fighters. Others are probably waiting for the US to leave before they begin to
inflict military and political damage to any hurriedly trained Iraqi military
force that the US might put in place, after it leaves. Due to the blitzkrieg
manner in which the US overran the country, the US military did not have enough
time to study, analyze, and understand the tactics that the Iraqis were using.
It appeared that when confronted by a much superior American military force, the
Iraqis tactically dispersed and hide their weapons. Today, those hidden weapons
are now handy for the guerrilla forces that are now targeting coalition
forces.
It should be recalled that during the 2nd World War, Germany
gained quick military victories against Soviet forces after launching a war on
the eastern front. However, by quickly overrunning Soviet positions, Germany did
not have enough time to rearrange its strategy and tactics. This resulted in
logistical gaps and created many reinforcement and supply problems. It also did
not allow German forces to conduct an effective study of Soviet military
capability. Evidently, when the Soviet Union counterattacked, German solders
were surprised and shocked. The Soviets mounted series of counter-offensives
that overwhelmed the Germans. Eventually, the Soviets matched into Berlin, after
decimating German forces along the way.
Thus, the achievement of quick
military victories due to technological superiority does not necessarily lead to
a very successful defeat of the opponent.
2. Intelligence
Capability: Due to the Cold War, no country today can boast of having a
superior intelligence gathering capability, regardless of its technological
know-how. It should be recalled that during the Cold War, the two superpowers
cultivated, sponsored, trained, and equipped the intelligence services of their
allies in the art of intelligence gathering, counter-intelligence, and special
intelligence operations. For example, when Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi got back
into power in 1963, "The CIA provided organizational and training assistance for
an intelligence organization for the shah" (Simonsen & Spindlove, 2000. p.
181). Likewise, "During the period of the cold war, Moscow's attempts to
destabilize the Western democracies involved the use of terror tactics against
not only nations but also symbolic personages (Ibid.). As a result, the
superpowers no longer have an edge in intelligence tactics, regardless of how
much they spend to upgrade their agencies. Consequently, just as the British can
use intelligence trickery, the Iraqis, Libyans, Israelis, Iranians, Cubans,
North Koreans, South Koreans, Nigerians, Chileans, Pakistanis, Indians, Syrians
etc. can do likewise. Just as the Russians can plant false information, the
Chechnyan rebels too can do likewise. Just as the United States was able to
manipulate intelligence against Iraq under Saddam Hussein, Iraq too was able to
do so against the US. Unconventional military forces like the Palestinian
militant groups, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia, the Irish
Republican Army, the ETA, Hezbollah, etc. are very adept in carrying out
intelligence operations as any nation-state.
3. Exercise of
Authority over Mineral and Natural Resources: States are losing the ability
to monopolize the control and exercise of authority over mineral resources in
their territories. Increasingly, in many mineral and natural resources-rich
territories, disappointed, disadvantaged, and frustrated groups are adopting
proactive militant tactics to oppose states capacity to exercise ultimate
authority over the exploration and marketing of the resources. The militants
have been able to disrupt states' ability to use profits from such resources to
build up their forces by attacking and pillaging the resources to build up their
own military capabilities. One of the most successful group to have used the
resources of the territory to its military advantage was the Union of Total
Independence for Angola (UNITA) which waged a bloody war against the MPLA
government of Angola for more than fifteen years, after the two had successfully
forced the Portuguese to give up its colonial control of the country. The
Columbian FARCE and ELN (National Liberation Army) too have been at it for up
for decades. Sierra Leone was almost torn apart by guerrilla forces that were
able to physically controlled diamond fields and used the diamonds to increase
their military capabilities. The harshness of the Sierra Leone's Civil War led
to a global effort to ban 'Blood Diamonds' (Physicians for Human Rights,
February, 2001, February 14). The Democratic Republic of the Congo and Central
African Republic are constantly in conflict because of minerals. Dissatisfied
political and military elements and their supporters in these two countries
often seize mineral fields and use those minerals to resist government authority
(Somerville, 2002, October 31). The Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) has
been very successful in challenging the Sudanese government and forcing it to
negotiate political rearrangement of the polity. Due to corruption and
insensitivity toward the oil-producing region of Nigeria, an increasing number
of ethnic youth groups are militarizing and challenging the authority of the
federal government to monopolize profits from oil exploration. The youth groups
are increasingly getting bolder in confronting federal troops and shooting it
out with them.
In some cases, militant groups cultivate relationships
with narcotic farmers and thereby reap financial benefits from protection fees
as well as directly getting involved in cultivating and selling the narcotics.
Popularly known as Narco-terrorism, militant groups in the Golden Triangle
(Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia etc), the Shinning Path in Peru, the FARCE,
ELN and right wing groups in Columbia, various groups including the Taliban, Al
Qaeda, and elements of Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, Hezbollah in the Bekka
Valley etc. have variously been accused of trading and dealing in heroin,
cocaine, and other illegal drugs to increase their financial wherewithal. By
earning money through protection fees and narcotics trade, a number of movements
are able to sufficiently finance their operations without relying on outside
assistance.
4. Military Occupation: As a result of the easy
availability of arms, the ability to generate income through controlling natural
and mineral resources and narcotics, it is now a no win situation for any
country to attempt to occupy another country or territory militarily. In the
colonial days and up to the end of the 2nd World War, it was quite manageable to
militarily occupy another country since total victory was possible then. Today,
a military occupier would be exposed to so many hazards of war due to the
possibility of resistance There are many contemporary examples to show the
futility of occupying another country.
a. The French attempt to treat
Algeria as a French foreign territory failed woefully because the Algerian
resistance refused to capitulate. The same could be said of the Vietnamese
resistance against the French and the Americans and the Angolan and Mozambican
resistance against Portugal. When Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982, it helped to
produce one of the most dedicated fighting groups in the Middle East. Hezbollah
waged war, using every means, including suicide bombing and rocket attacks
against Israel. Later, Israel had to withdraw from Lebanon because the
occupation was costing too much and draining the Israeli military. The United
States has now realized that a military occupation of Iraq would cost too much
in terms of money, military morale and international political relations. It has
already spent over $70 billion and there is no hope of stability in Iraq in the
nearest future. Britain is reported to have almost exhausted its defense budget
in Iraq, spending about $34 billion.
4. Conventional vs.
Unconventional Warfare: States are increasingly at a military disadvantage
as they rely mostly on conventional forces to fight against unconventional
forces. States generally rely on conventional forces due to the need to protect
and hold territory. It is not a secret that regular military forces find it very
difficult to fight guerrilla warfare. The reason being that they are generally
trained to fight in formations approved by the military chain of command. They
are also obligated to obey the laws of war, especially, the rules concerning
non-combatant immunity and the treatment of prisoners of war. On the other hand,
unconventional forces are not encumbered by such legalities. They are free to
use assorted tactics to achieve their goals.
Perhaps, the greatest
impediment to the conventional military system is the financial cost. It costs
more to maintain a conventional force than a non-conventional force. For
example, a conventional force requires military barracks, jet-fighters, tanks,
bombers, artillery pieces, uniforms, a fleet of vehicles to supply and reinforce
the forces, boots, a large number of active and support personnel, massive food
etc. An unconventional force does need most of the stated equipments and
devices. A conventional force always tries to hold and protect a territory when
engaged in a combat while an unconventional force does not need to hold a
territory while fighting. It costs so much, in terms of personnel, equipment,
food, housing, and money to hold a territory while fighting a
war.
Generally, the most powerful countries have the greatest number of
conventional forces. On the other hand, the less powerful countries tend to
depend more on unconventional forces and tactics. Worst, suppressed, exploited,
frustrated, and very angry groups rely even more on unconventional tactics. The
most powerful forces always believe in using their overwhelming military power
to subdue their less powerful opponents. On the other hand, the less powerful
opponents always try to minimize the awesome might of the most powerful forces
by using hide and seek tactics to frustrate and neutralize the big guns. This is
why total military victory is very difficult to achieve today. There are many
examples in the world.
a. Britain began to wage war to put an end to the
Irish Republican Army, going back to the beginning of the twentieth century.
Each time it assumed that it had won the war, the IRA would reemerge to continue
the struggle. Tired of the back and forth experience, both sides decided to
negotiate an end to the Irish conflict politically. Of course, the Irish problem
still remains unresolved but there is more political communication among the
parties.
b. Vietnam, being less powerful than France and the United
States, used a combination of conventional and unconventional tactics to
counterbalance the military might of the two.
c. The FARCE (The Armed
Revolutionary Forces of Columbia) and the ELN (National Liberation Army) in
Columbia have been very successful fighting the national armed forces of
Columbia to a draw on many occasions. As a result, they are able to survive
various attempts to annihilate them. Even US support for the Columbian
government has not made a difference in the military balance of power in the
country. Therefore, Columbia is a country with four well armed military forces:
the government forces, the FARCE, the ELN, and the right wing forces. The
country suffers from perpetual military indigestion.
d. The Shining Path
in Peru comes and goes like the water of the ocean. When Peruvian forces press
too hard, it appears to wither away only to come back and surprise the state.
Even the capture of its most recognizable leader, Abimael Guzman, a Chinese
trained revolutionary, in September 1992, has not put an end to the
movement.
e. Israel is considered to be the most able fighting force in
the Middle East. It crushed regular Arab forces in lightening strikes and
counterattacks in 1948, 1967, and 1973 against formidable Jordanian, Syrian and
Egyptian forces. Yet, Israeli forces have been unable to put a final blow to the
survival of the unconventional Arab forces (the PLO, Al Fatah, Islamic Jihad,
Hamas, Hezbollah). These unconventional forces tend to melt down tactically and
reappear on the scene with a bang. Israel is being drained politically,
economically, and militarily by the presence of these forces that are so
difficult to destroy with a finality. Suicide bombing (homicide bombing) has
become their tactical trade mark. Chairman Yasser Arafat represents the face of
the unconventional Arab warrior. It appears that each time Israel launches a
major conventional attack to dismantle the guerrilla forces, it often ends up
creating a more dangerous militant hybrid of the factions.
f. Russia is
considered to be the second greatest military power on earth, after the United
States. Of course, both can easily annihilate each other through nuclear
attacks. Despite this ability, the Russians have not been able to nailed the
Chechnyans rebels down and end the rebellion. The rebels have been able to
withstand Russia's might by using effective guerilla tactics. Even
scourged-earth military tactics by Russian forces to wipe them out have not been
successful. The Russian military establishment is in a state of serious
doubtfulness about the use of the military to solve the Chechnyan problem. Many
Chechnyan rebels were former Soviet soldiers and know Russian military tactics
very well. Some of them also fought in Afghanistan.
g. President Yoweri
Museveni of Uganda came to power through waging a successful guerrilla war
against President Milton Obote and Idi Amin elements. Since he ascended the
presidential throne in the 1980s, Ugandan forces have been fighting
unsuccessfully to destroy the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and other armed
groups. Evidently, Uganda is in a perpetual state of war with many guerrilla
factions vying for power (Federation of American Scientists, Military Analysis
Network). Burundi also suffers from military indigestion since it is in a
perpetual state of war because government forces have not been able to defeat
the Hutu guerilla forces that occasionally destabilize the country
(Ibid).
h. Former President Charles Taylor was able to prevail through
the bloody Liberian civil wars. However, his military successes were limited by
the emergence of the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD)
and later Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL). These forces almost
threatened to overrun the entire country in the late 2003s before African
governments seriously negotiated a ceasefire and forced the departure of Mr.
Taylor. (Doyle, 2003, June 27). Had Mr. Taylor not leave, the LURD and MODEL
forces would have captured the entire country but their victory too would have
been short-lived because Mr. Taylor and his supporters would have rearmed and
continue the struggle, possibly extending the Liberian War again into Sierra
Leone and the Ivory Coast. Such is the nature of modern warfare.
i. When
the generals tactically prevented Moslem political leaders from winning and
running the government in early 1992 by suspending presidential elections in
Algeria, little did they know that they were setting in motion an uncontrollable
military catastrophe. Since that fateful military coup to stop the Islamic
political machine, Algeria has been traumatized as the deprived Moslems formed
the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) to fight back. Algeria is in a state of no war
no peace with both sides still trying to overwhelm each other militarily. The
struggle between the government and the FIS has resulted in the deaths of
thousands of Algerians. The conflict has generated other militant Islamic groups
such as the Armed Islamic Group (now disbanded), and the Salafist Group for
Preaching and Combat (GSPC) (BBC News Africa, 2003, February 26, pp.
1-4).
5. Scientific and Technological Capability: There is no
doubt that the Industrial Revolution immeasurable aided the ascendancy of
European military, economic, and political power in the world. During the
colonial period and up to the late 1970s, the West and the Soviet Union had a
monopoly of technological power. This is no longer the case as the technological
genie has been set out. Initially, assisted by the Cold War superpowers, many
countries today have developed self-sustaining technological capability. The
list of countries with such capabilities continues to grow by the day: China,
North Korea, South Korea, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Singapore, Malaysia, Taiwan,
Cuba, Czech Republic, Iraq, Iran, Israel, India, Pakistan, South Africa, Libya,
Mexico, Egypt, Syria, etc. Thus, the gap between the developed and the
developing world, in terms of technological capability, is gradually
diminishing, particularly in the area of arms production.
6. Arms
Manufacturing: As a result of the increasing technological capability of
many developing countries, arms production is no longer limited to the advanced
or industrialized countries. Many developing countries are now producing and
selling arms. The big military powers cannot effectively control the arms
manufacturing business anymore. The implication being that arms are available
everywhere and can be bought anywhere. In particular, automatic rifles, machine
guns, medium range rockets, missiles, anti aircraft guns, shoulder-held rockets
etc. can be bought in many parts of the world.
7. Biochemical
Weapons: While the nuclear club is still limited to a few members due to the
complexity of the technology and the huge financial investment needed to build
one, biochemical weapons cost far less and easier to produce. Consequently, many
countries, including developed, newly industrializing, and developing, have
stockpiles of biochemical weapons. Even guerrilla movements are reported to have
a great interest in acquiring these weapons. The implication being that no
country can be taken lightly anymore, just because it is either small or poor.
This further adds to the difficulty of achieving total military victory in a
military confrontation between two states. Iraq experienced the difficulty of
winning a war against Iran when it attacked the country in the 1980s. Despite
using both conventional and biochemical weapons, Iran refused to capitulate and
continued the war. The US had to step in to assist Iraq to stave off an Iranian
victory. Britain also experienced some difficulty before defeating Argentina in
the Falkland (Malvina) War. It was widely reported that British victory was
aided by extensive American support. In other words, without American
assistance, the British would have found it exceedingly difficult to beat
Argentina, especially, considering the fact that Britain had to cover a distance
of over 5,000 nautical miles in order to reinforce its forces.
8.
Military Strategies and Tactics: No state today can boast of possessing
superior military strategies and tactics. The reason being that during the Cold
War, both the United States and the Soviet Union trained millions of people in
military strategies and tactics as they fought the Cold War. Likewise, armed
forces from various countries received extensive military training through
military assistance programs from the developed countries. Resultantly, it was
not uncommon for Nigerian, Somali, Indian. Pakistani, Argentine, Tanzanian,
Egyptian, Syrian, Iraqi, Ghanaian, etc. soldiers to receive training in the US,
the Soviet Union, Britain, France, North Korea, China, Cuba etc. In some cases,
forces from the developing countries actually received a greater exposure to
multiple military strategies and tactics than those of the United States, the
Soviet Union, Britain, and France since they were sent all over the world for
military training. The Somali fighters used their military exposure to the
American and Soviet tactics to advantage during the UN efforts to apprehend Gen.
Mohammed Aided.
One could even say that the PLO, Hezbollah, IRA, the
Taliban, Al Qaeda, Chechnyan guerrillas, ETA, etc, are beneficiaries of the
extensive tactical exposure received during various phases of training in many
parts of the world.
9. Non-governmental and Non-territorial
Forces: The idea of a total military victory is being confounded by the
emergence and growth of non-governmental and non-territorial professionally
armed militant organizations. The Al Qaeda is the most sophisticated of the new
military phenomenon. Before and during the Cold War, military forces were either
owned by the state or operated for the purpose of achieving territorial goals.
For example, the IRA, PLO, HAMAS, ETA, FARCE, IRA, LURDS, Shining Path, LRA,
LURD, SPLA, the Kurdish Democratic party of Iran, the Armenian secret Army,
Kurdistan Workers Party etc. are territorially based organizations since their
objectives are intended to achieve political goals that are connected
intricately with their homelands.
On the other hand, the Socialists,
Leftists/Revolutionaries who opposed the fascist system during the Spanish civil
war in the 1930s could be identified as having started the modern version of the
non-territorial militant movement. Fighters came from different parts of the
world to join the opposition against Gen. Francisco Franco. They were driven by
an ideology. These ideologically motivated fighters were later followed by the
Japanese Red Army, the Red Brigade, the German Army Faction (Meinhoff Gang) etc.
However, the later forces were technically connected to their states of origin:
Japan, Italy, and Germany, even though they were able to carry out operations in
other parts of the world. The Al Qaeda could be said to be the most successful
modern military outfit that is not tied to any particular territory. As a
result, it is like a social cancer because it can manifest itself in so many
different ways and in different places at the same time. It is the most
internationalized non-governmental military enterprise that is capable of
inflicting destruction in any part of the world at any time.
10:
Conventionalization of Unconventional Forces: Decisive military victories
and defeats are also being thwarted by the increasing conventionalization of
many irregular forces. Organizations like the FARCE in Columbia and Hezbollah in
Lebanon etc. have grown to the extent of developing both conventional and
unconventional capabilities. This means that they can launch conventional as
well as guerrilla attacks simultaneously without totally risking the
survivability of the entire organization. They do so by upgrading their
organizational structure, armaments and personnel. Some of these forces are also
working very hard to acquire biochemical and dirty nuclear bomb capabilities.
The Taliban started as a guerrilla force, later became a conventional military
when they took over power in Afghanistan and are now a guerrilla force again,
after having been driven out of power by the United States. Some elements of the
Kurdish resistance (particularly the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) in Northern Iraq have developed some conventional
capability, in the sense that they have been serving as the Kurdish Army in
Northern Iraq.
11. Military Conflicts in Tribalized and
Communalized Societies: It is exceedingly difficult to achieve military
victory in highly tribalized and communalized societies. The reason being that
in such societies, the issues are very often complicated and greatly interwoven.
Likewise, people in such societies fight total wars in the sense that the
slightest provocation tends to arouse total communal reaction. This is why
conflicts in Africa and the Middle East tend to go on endlessly. It also
accounts for the complicated political and military situations in the Balkan
region of Europe. Post-Saddam's Iraq is becoming very complicated to deal with
like Somali, Algeria, Yugoslavia, Liberia, etc... as various groups tussle for
power.
12. Preemptive Military Attack: Preemptive military
attack against an opponent in today's world is a very risky proposition due to
the easy availability of arms and the ability on the part of the preemptive
target to respond using both conventional and unconventional methods. Perhaps,
in the last thirty years, only Israel has succeeded in launching a very
successful preemptive attack when it destroyed Iraqi nuclear facilities. It also
carried out a daring rescue operation in Uganda to rescue Israeli citizens. A
failed preemptive action can easily turn into a military
disaster.
The Need to Change the Notion of Military
Victory
It is obvious that the concept of military victory has
become very complicated. It is quite possible to win a war militarily and loss
the war psychologically and politically. The US forces won the battles but lost
the war in Vietnam. France inflicted so much destruction and death in Algeria
and yet, lost the war. Both Israel and Egypt claimed to have won the Yom Kippur
war of 1973; one physically and the other psychologically. Israel physically
defeated the Palestinian Liberation Organization and the Islamic forces in
Lebanon in 1982. Yet, the Hezbollah persisted until Israel had to withdraw from
South Lebanon. Sri Lanka tried very hard to destroy the Tamal guerrillas and
could not do so for almost twenty years. The U.S. easily overran Taliban and Al
Qaeda positions in Afghanistan, yet, the war has not ended. The United States
and Britain are embroiled in a politico-military situation in Iraq that could go
on for sometime as the guerrilla forces continue to destabilize the nation.
Sudan, Uganda, Burundi, Colombia, India/Pakistan, Sri Lanka, etc, are embroiled
in stalemated conflicts because the government forces are unable to defeat the
guerrilla forces and vice versa.
As the nature of military victory
changes, some of the strategic and tactical advises given by the great Chinese
military genius, Sun Tzu, might need some readjustment. For example, his
statement:
"In practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take the
enemy's country whole and intact, to shatter and destroy it is not so good. So,
too, it is better to capture a regiment, a detachment or a company entire than
to destroy them…
Therefore, the skillful leader subdues the enemy's
troops without any fighting; he captures their cities without laying siege to
them; he overthrows their kingdom without lengthy operations in the field"
(Chapter 3, trans. by Giles, 1910). might not be very practical today since the
implements of war are readily available, thereby making it exceedingly difficult
to capture a territory without inflicting much destruction. It is also very
difficult to apply this tactics today since guerrilla warfare can wreck havoc on
conventional strategy and tactics.
Summary and
Conclusion
1. There is no doubt that the Cold War helped tremendously
to change many aspects of warfare in the modern era. It helped to spread wars
and weapons of war, enhanced the technological ability of many nations to
produce arms, exposed millions of people to military strategies and tactics
through training, and provided combat experiences. It helped to create a balance
of military capability throughout the regions of the world. As a result, no
nation can conveniently claim to be a monopolistic military power today.
2. Increasingly, modern warfare is characterized by indecisive outcomes
rather than by outright victories. Military victory is becoming an infrequent
experience in war. A supposedly defeated force, in a conventional sense, can
easily reemerge to continue the war by guerrilla means. In the modern era,
defeated forces can come back very quickly to continue the war due to the easy
availability of guns, the ability to raise funds through various means, and the
extensive military skills that have been spread around. Countries like Uganda.
Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia, Colombia, Peru, Nepal, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka,
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Britain (Northern Ireland), Spain (Basque
separatist), Israel (Israeli/Palestinian conflict), Algeria, Indonesia,
Philippines, Russia (Chechnya), Burundi, Rwanda, Iraq after Saddam Hussein, etc.
are engaged in wars that could go on for long durations due to the complexity of
the political, economic, religious, and military issues.
3. Political and
military leaders need to become aware of the changing trend in modern warfare
and avoid trapping themselves in military engagements that could cause
innumerable political and economic damages to their states. Michael Hill (2003,
August 21) noticed the change in the nature of modern warfare when he
wrote:
"Taylor may have gone, but left behind are armed gangs of young
toughs - some are rebels, some are government troops - who have ruled the place
with rape, pillage and murder for the 14 years since Taylor unleashed the
rebellion that put him in charge."
They should also realize that it is
increasingly difficult to determine when a war has been won. For example, the US
declared victories in Afghanistan and Iraq, yet, the wars continue. Israel
militarily won the Yom Kippur war, yet, Egypt insisted that it won it. Saddam
Hussein refused to concede defeat in the First Persian Gulf War, hence, behaved
in such a way as to lead to the 2nd Persian Gulf War., before being driven out
of power. Yet, Iraq is still at war.
4. Consequently, it is strategically
crucial for leaders to move away from the idea that warfare can be used to solve
political problems. Leaders need to put less emphasis on the use of the military
and security forces and concentrate more on political negotiations to resolve
internal and international problems. So far, in the late twentieth and early
twenty-first centuries, the deployment of the military in situations that
require political solutions have backfired on many occasions. In other cases,
the military adventures resulted in protracted conflicts.
Recommendations
The following five conflict
resolution models seem very attractive in resolving potential military conflicts
in the modern era. They are (1) the 2nd World War Model, (2) the Nigerian Model,
(3) the South African Model, (4) The Czechoslovakian Model, and (5) the
unfolding Sudanese Model.
1. The 2nd. World War Model: At the end of
the 2nd World War, instead of taking punitive measures against Germany and
Japan, the United States actually helped them to overcome the hardships of the
2nd World War by launching the Marshall Plan. The plan enabled the Europeans and
the Japanese to reconstruct their shattered economic infrastructures (Goldstein,
2004, p. 35). By doing so, the US made great friends and helped to stave of a
potential Third World War. Unfortunately, the US failed to apply this model in
Iraq after driving away Saddam Hussein. In a show of strength, the US decided to
disband the defeated Iraqi forces and create a new one. In so doing, it has
created an environment in which more than half a million trained combatants roam
free and sow trouble for the coalition forces.
2. The Nigerian Model:
Even though the civil war was very bloody, Nigerians did not go for revengeful
killings at the end of the war. To avoid revengeful attacks and counterattacks,
Nigerian and Biafran leaders devised a political formula that resulted in the
"No Victor no vanquish' end to the bloody civil. The strategy worked so
effectively that one week after the civil war, it was difficult to tell whether
Nigerians had fought a very bloody war. The Hausas, Yorubas, and members of
other ethnic groups poured into Igboland to continue their prewar businesses and
a large number of the Igbos who used to live in various parts of Nigeria went
back to their former places of residence. Nigerians went about their businesses
as if nothing had happened. Nigeria immediately launched the Reconciliation,
Rehabilitation, and Reconstruction (RRR) program to try to ameliorate the pains
of the civil war.
The "no victor and no vanquish" and the three Rs
originated from the traditional African cultural system which encourages
forgiveness, dialogue, compromise, and consensus. Due to the ingenuity of the
effort, Nigeria avoided the protracted Angolan, Somali, Liberian, Burundian,
Ugandan, Rwandan, Congolese etc. situations after the civil war.
Unfortunately, Nigerian leaders today and in the recent past, have
ignored the Nigerian Civil War model and used military and security forces to
teach trouble-makers a lesson. It is even sad that President Olusegun Obasanjo,
who was a major participant in the institutionalization of the Nigerian model,
seems to ignore the model while trying to resolve political, religious, and
ethnic problems in the country. This is leading to the political polarization
and destabilization of the country. Under his current administration, there is a
proclivity toward using the military to solve political problems. In the Warri
crisis, for example, many prominent Nigerians have warned about the danger of
trying to resolve the problem with military means. For example, A Delta state
political leader, Chief Great Ogboru advised 'The solution to the problem is not
militarization of the city…government must employ dialogue" (Akinola, 2003,
August 21). Another leader, Chief S.Y. Mamamu, commented about the unnecessary
waste of money on military security in the Niger Delta by saying:
"the
huge money committed to security of oil producing states at the expense of
development in the Niger Delta is wasteful. The money can be used judiciously to
build industries and bridges in the region. All these would bring in more
development that would ensure that more youths get engaged in profitable
ventures rather than conflict" (Okhomina, 2004, January 7).
3. The South
African Model: The South Africans surprised the world. Many people expected a
protracted racial war involving blacks and whites. Many also thought that the
blacks would go for revengeful retaliation. Instead of a bloody racial war, the
South Africans decided to forgive each other. Instead of a punitive and
retributive criminal trial of those who perpetrated the antihuman apartheid
system, they instituted the Truth Commission, spurred by Bishop Desmond Tutu.
The fact that there was no concerted effort to legally penalize anyone for
crimes committed during the apartheid era, enabled the races to reconcile and
saved South Africa from a potential bloody civil war. The Truth Commission
enabled the participants to explain their roles and experiences during the
tumultuous period. Former President Nelson Mandela decided to sheath the sword
and opted for a peaceful coexistence among the races ( Hill, 2003, August 21).
4. The Czechoslovakian Model: This model is derived from the
Czechoslovakian political effort to end the state (Republic of Czechoslovakia)
peacefully without fighting a civil war between the two major ethnic groups. The
Czechs and Slovakians agreed to a peace formula in which the two major ethnic
groups decided to part ways without fighting a bloody civil war. As a result,
the former Czechoslovakia is now divided into two sovereign nation-states: the
Czech Republic and Slovakia.
There is no doubt that many states,
especially the former colonies, in the world need this formula in order to
reduce interethnic, inter-religious, and inter-political conflicts. In
particular, the African Union should look for ways of encouraging this model in
many parts of the continent where irredentists and separatists conflicts are
rife. Likewise, Spain, Indonesia, Philippines, Iraq, DRC, etc. should look
favorably at this model to solve their political problems.
5. The
Sudanese Model: After trying every means possible to annihilate each other and
not succeeding for about twenty years, the two parties in the Sudanese civil War
(the government and Southern rebels) have tentatively decided to adopt a more
peaceful formula to end the conflict. The two sides have cautiously agreed to
share the oil wealth and end the conflict ( BBC News World Africa 2004, January
9). While the plan is still at a very basic stage since it has not been
implemented, it is going to be an attractive model for ending conflicts.
Nigeria, Angola, DRC, Indonesia, Ecuador, Iraq, etc. should examine this model
with a view of adopting it in the future to settle their political and economic
crises.
As can be seen, nations, states, and leaders that have tried
to use punitive military and legal systems to punish those considered as
trouble-makers have actually contributed to the further polarization of their
societies. The Angolans, Eritreans, Ethiopians, Congolese, Liberians, Sierra
Leonians, Columbians, Peruvians, Nepalese, Sri Lankans, Indians, Pakistanis,
Afghans etc. wanted to win decisive military victories. Instead of victory, they
prolonged the agony in their countries. Hill (2003, August 21) noted quite
rightly:
"Wars started for whatever reason - good or bad - often leave a
country with the message that violence is a suitable solution to problems. Once
the social fabric is ripped apart by that idea, it is very difficult to stitch
it back together. The globe is full of examples. Liberia and Iraq might be the
latest."
It appears that many political and military leaders are
recognizing the need to apply non-military means to resolve political conflicts.
It is interesting to note that African leaders combined the Nigerian and the
South African models in an effort to resolve the Liberian conflict. The MPLA and
the former UNITA have integrated their forces to create a united Angolan
government. The Sudanese government and the Sudan's Peoples Liberation Army
(SPLA) have agreed to resolve their conflict by sharing the wealth of the
nation. Israel and the Hezbollah have negotiated to exchange
prisoners.
The aforementioned five models are based on the belief that
forgiveness is a very powerful human tool to bring people together. In the
modern era, any leader who wishes to use military force to settle political
problems might be courting a very serious trouble because military victory is no
longer what it used to be. The UN should encourage the application of these
models, instead of the punitive legal model that is being
universalized.
The modern era demands from leaders a high level of
intellectual creativity and problem solving skills, not war as a solution to
political problems.
References
Akinola, W. (2003,
august 21). Full-scale military action won't end Warri war - Ogboru. Vanguard.
(Online) http://www.guardianngr.com/articles/2002/niger_delta/nd221082663.stm.
8/22/03.
BBC News Africa. (2003, February 26). Algeria's export of
terror. (Online) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2802839.stm.
2/27/03
BBC News Africa. (2004, January 9). Press hails Sudan wealth
deal. (Online) http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/Africa/382797.stm.
1/11/04.
Byrd, R. (2003, September 29). Putting the president's $87
billion for Iraq in context.
United States Senate. (Online)
http://byrd..senate.gov/byrd_speeches/byrd_speeches_2003september/byrd_speeches_2003.
1/27/04
Doyle, M. (2003, June 27, p.2). Analysis: Liberia's balance of
forces. BBC News Africa (Online) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3024036.stm.
6/27.03.
Duncan, W., Jancar-Webster, B., & Switky, B. (2003). World
Politics in the 21sit century Pearson & Longman..
Federation of
American Scientists. (2004, January 27). Uganda Civil War. (Military Analysis
Network. (Online) http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/war/uganda.htm.
1/27/04
Giles, L (1910) (Trans.). The Art of War by Sun Tzu. Department
of Oriental Printed
Books, British Musuem. Brought by Korea WebWeekly
(Online) http://www.kimsof.com/po/war.htm. 1/4/04.
Goldstein, J. (2004).
International Relations. Fifth edition. Longman.
Hill, M. (2003, August
21). Getting rid of villains doesn't solve all the world's problems.
Gulf
News. (Online) http://www.gulf-news.com/Articles/opinion.asp?ArticleID=95684.
8/21/03.
Okhomina, O. (2004, January 7). FG wastes money on troops in
N-Delta-Mamamu. Vanguard.
(Online)http://www.vanguardngr.com/articles/2002/niger_delta/nd307012004.html.
1/11/04.
Physicians for Human Rights. (2001, February 14). The campaign
to eliminate conflict diamonds. (Online)
http://www.phrusa.org/campaigns/sierra_leone/campaign_clean_diamonds.html.
1.27/04.
Roberts, C. (2003, July 27). Military rebellion in the
Philippines continues. CNN Sunday Morning. (Online)
http://static.elibrary.com/c/cnnsundaymorning/July272003/military/rebellioninthe
philippine... 1/27/04
Rourke, J., & Boyer, M. (1996). International
politics on the world stage. Brief edition.
Dushkin &
McGraw-Hill.
Simonsen, C., & Sindlove, J. (2000) Terrorism Today: The
past, the players, and the future. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice
Hall.
Singer, R. (2001, March 14). Militants fracture Nigerian society.
Christian Science Monitor. (Online)
http://www.csmonitor.com/durable/2001/03/14/p6s1.htm.
3/16/01.
Somerville, K. (2002, October 31). Diamonds fuel CAR conflicts.
BBC News Africa. (Online) http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi.world/africa.23/2133.stm.
11/03/02.
Wallbank, T., Taylor, A., & Bailey, N. (1976).
Civilization: past and present. Volume 1. Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman
and Company.
|
|