The Amalgamation Of Nigeria Was A Fraud
Richard Akinjide, QC, SAN
July 9, 2000
Lagos - I Was in the first cabinet that was overthrown by the military
in this country. I entered parliament in December 12, 1959. And I
remained in Parliament until January 15, 1966 when the Government was
overthrown. I was the Federal Minister of Education in that cabinet.
I woke up in the morning in my official house in Ikoyi to discover
that my telephone was not working. I had never experienced coup before
nor did I know that it was a coup, thinking it was just a telephone
fault; until a colleague of mine in the cabinet Chief Abiodun Akerele,
came in and told me there had been a military coup. So I had the fortune
or the misfortune of being a victim of the first coup ever in this
Many people may not know that I spent 18 months in detention in
prisons across the country. I've spent the time in Kirikiri prison,
Ilesha prison, Ibadan prison and the Abeokuta prison Two of us who were
in Balewa's government emerged when the military handed over to
civilians in 1979 as part of the civilian Government. In Balewa's
government, Alhaji Shehu Shagari was the Minister of Works while I was
the Minister of Education. When the Military handed over to us after
about 14 years, Shagari emerged as the President, while I became the
Attorney - General and Minister of Justice. Again, Shagari's government
was overthrown just a few months after I left the cabinet. Of course, we
suspected it was coming.
A lot of things that happened between that period and now would never
see the light of the day. When you are in government, you know a lot of
things; you see a lot of things. A lot of things you know or did or saw
will die with you. This is the practice the whole world. People have
asked me to write my memoirs, I just laugh because there are certain
things I can never reveal. When I was in Tafawa Balewa's Cabinet, all
Cabinet ministers had access to written intelligence
report every month. That was the practice at that time. But when Shagari
came in, for reasons, which I cannot explain, that practice was no
longer followed. But by virtue of my duties as the Attorney - General
and as a member of the National Security Council, I continued to have
access to some sensitive matters.
Nigeria is a very complex country. Our problems did not start
yesterday. It started about 1884. Lord Lugard came here about 1894 and
many people did not know that Major Lugard was not originally employed
by the British Government. He was employed by companies. He was first
employed by East Indian Company, by the Royal East African Company and
then by the Royal Niger Company. It was from the Royal Niger Company
that he transferred to the British government. Unless you know
this background, you will not know the root causes of our problems. The
interest of the Europeans in Africa and indeed Nigeria was economic and
it's still economic. They have no permanent friends and no permanent
interests. Neither their interests nor their friends are permanent.
Nigeria was created as British sphere of interests for business. In
1898, Lugard formed the West African Frontier Force initially with 2,000
soldiers and that was the beginning of our problems.
Anybody who wants to know the root cause of all the coups and our
present problems, and who does not know the evolution Nigeria would just
be looking at the matter superficially. Our problems started from that
time. And Lugard was what they called at that time imperialist. A number
of British soldiers, businessmen, politicians were very patriotic. But I
must warn you; they were operating in the interest of their country.
Lugard became a Lord.
Nigerians, too, should operate in the interest of their country. When Lugard
formed the West African Frontier Force with 2,000 troops, about 90 percent
of them were from the North mainly from the Middle belt. And his dispatches
to London between that time and January 1914 are extremely interesting.
Lugard came here for a purpose and that purpose was British interest. Between
1898 and 1914, he sent a number of dispatches to London which led to the
Amalgamation of 1914.
The Order - in - Council was drawn up in November 1913 signed and
came into force in January 1914. In those dispatches, Lugard said a
number of things, which are at the root causes of yesterday and today's
The British needed the Railway from the North to the Coast in the
interest of British business. Amalgamation of the South (not of the
people) became of crucial importance to British business interest. He
said the North and the South should be amalgamated. Southern Nigeria
came into existence on January 1900 ... At the Centenary of the fall of
Benin, I wrote a piece in a number of papers but before I published the
piece, I sent a copy to the Oba of Benin. So when Benin was
conquered in 1896, it made the creation of the Southern Nigerian
protectorate possible on January 1, 1900.
If you remember, Sokoto was not conquered until 1903. So, there was
no question of Nigeria at that time. After the conquest of Sokoto, they
were able to create the northern Nigerian protectorate. Lugard went full
blast and created what was to be known as the protectorate of Northern
Nigeria. What is critical and important are the reasons Lugard gave in
his dispatches. They are as follows: He said the North is poor and they
have no resources to run the protectorate of the
North. That they have no access to the sea; that the South has resources
and have educated people.
The first Yoruba lawyer was called to the Bar in 1861. Therefore,
because it was not the policy of the British Government to bring the
taxpayers money to run the protectorate, it was in the interest of the
British business and the British taxpayer that there should be
Amalgamation. But what the British amalgamated was the Administration of
the North and South and not the people of the North and the South, that
is one of the root causes of the problems of Nigeria and the
When the amalgamation took effect, the British government sealed off
the South from the North. And between 1914 andl960, that's a period of
46 years, the British allowed minimum contact between the North and
South because it was not in the British interest that the North be
allowed to be polluted by the educated South. That was the basis on
which we got our independence in 1960 when I was in the parliament. I
entered Parliament on December 12, 1959. When the North formed a
political party, the northern leaders called it Northern Peoples
Congress (NPC). They didn't call it Nigeria Peoples Congress. That was
in accordance with the dictum and policies of Lugard. When Aminu Kano
formed his own party, it was called Northern Elements Progressive Union
(NEPU) not Nigerian Progressive Union.
It was only Awolowo and Zik who were mistaken that there was anything
called Nigeria. Infact, the so-cared Nigeria created in 1914 was a
complete fraud. It was created not in the interest of Nigeria or
Nigerians but in the interest of the British. And what were the
structures created? The structures created were as follows: Northern
Nigeria was to represent England; Western Nigeria like Wales; Eastern
Nigeria was to be like Scotland. In the British structure, England has
permanent majority in the House of Commons. There was no way Wales can
ever dominate England, neither can Scotland dominate Britain. But they
are very shrewd. They would allow a Scottish man to become Prime
Minister. They would allow a Welsh man to become Prime Minister in
London but the fact remains that the actual power rested in England.
That was what Lugard created in Nigeria, a permanent majority for the
North. The population figure of the North is also a fraud. Infact, a
British Colonial Civil Servant who was involved in the fraud was trying
to expose it but he was never allowed to publish it. The analysis is as
follows: If you look at the map of West Africa, starting from Mauritania
to Cameroun and take a population of each country as you move from the
coast to the Savannah, the population decreases.
Or conversely, as you come from the Desert to the Coast, right from
Mauritania to the Cameroun, the population increases. The only exception
throughout that zone is Nigeria. Nigeria is the only zone whereby you
go from coast to the North, the population increases and you come from
the North to the Coast, the population decreases. Well, geographers,
anthropologists and population experts, draw your conclusions, Someone
has told me the last population census was done by
computer, what a nonsense.
A computer is as good as its programmer. A computer will produce what you
ask it to produce. I have read this book from cover to cover. This is a
fantastic book. I want us to find a way to ensure that as many Nigerians
read this book. It is a raw material for future authors. There is one thing
which is missing in the book and that is the first broadcast of General
Ibrahim Babangida when he assumed power in 1985. That broadcast is very
crucial to the economic problems we have today. ... Talking on the first
coup, when Balewa got missing, we knew Okotie- Eboh had been died, we knew
Akintola had been killed. We, the members of the Balewa cabinet started
meeting. But how can you have a cabinet meeting without the Prime Minister
acting or Prime Minister presiding. So, unanimously, we nominated acting
Prime Minister amongst us. Then we continued holding our meetings. Then
we got a message that we should all assemble at the Cabinet office. All
the Ministers were requested by the G.O.C. of the Nigerian Army, General
Ironsi to assemble.
What was amazing at that time was that Ironsi was going all over Lagos
unarmed. We assembled there. Having nominated ZANA Diphcharima as our acting
Prime Minister in the absence of the Prime Minister, whose whereabout we
didn't know, we approached the acting President, Nwafor Orizu to swear
him in because he cannot legitimately act as the Prime Minister except
he is sworn- in. Nwafor Orizu refused. He said he needed to contact Zik
who was then in West Indies.
Under the law, that is, the Interpretation Act, as acting President,
Nwazor Orizu had all the powers of the President. The GOC said he wanted
to see all the cabinet ministers. And so we assembled at the cabinet
office. Well, I have read in many books saying that we handed over to
the military. We did not hand-over. Ironsi told us that "you either hand
over as gentlemen or you hand-over by force". These were his words. Is
that voluntary hand-over? So we did not
hand-over. We wanted an Acting Prime Minister to be in place but Ironsi
forced us, and I use the word force advisedly, to handover to him. He
was controlling the soldiers.
The acting President, Nwafor Orizu, who did not cooperate with us,
cooperated with the GOC. Dr. Orizu and the GOC prepared speeches which
Nwafor Orizu broadcast handing over the government of the country to the
army. I here state again categorically as a member of that cabinet that
we did not hand-over voluntarily. It was a coup. This is a very good
book, which everybody must read. It is raw material for future authors.
Anybody, who wants to know some of the causes of our
problems, military instability should read this book. I even recommend
this book to all universities and secondary schools, so that they can
know how we get to where we are now. What this book shows is that if
anybody stages a coup and if people don't accept it, it would not
succeed. What puzzles me is how the author got all these materials. He
must have connections in high places to be able to get a lot of these
These materials should not be in the archives, they should be in the
public domain so that we know the causes of our problems. I pray that
all Nigerians should rise up and say no if anybody seizes a radio
station and says "fellow countrymen". I hope that this book will find
its way into all university libraries throughout this country, to all
secondary school library and abroad. I appeal to the media to give this
book a comprehensive and desired review.
The more I open the book, the more I see something to talk about.
This book is going to represent one of those chapters in the tragedy of
Nigeria. This book is just like horror film because the instability
which was started in I966 ... because many of the coups are what I'll
call commercial coups. If anything at all, we have to learn a great
lesson from this book and also learn a lesson on what happened, who
failed or succeed in their coups. When it succeeds. They call it
glorious revolution. But when it fails, it is called treason. It is my
honour and privilege to present this great and historic book. One of the
things I like about the book is the language of the author. He's
someone who speaks Englishman's English. He writes Queen's English. Very
lucid, very flowing.
|Federal Capital: Abuja
|Area: 923,768,64 Sq. Km
||Banks: 8 a.m. - 3 p.m. Monday only
|Population: 110 Million
8 a.m. - 1.30 p.m. Tues. - Fri.
|Principal Rivers: Niger and Benue
|Independence Day: October 1
||Federal Government Offices:
|Remembrance Day: January 15
||7.30 a.m. - 3.30 p.m. Mon. - Fri.
= 100 Kobo
|Time: GMT + 1 EST + 6
|Climate: Humid Sub-Tropical
||8.00 a.m. - 5.00 p.m. Mon. - Fri.
|Weights and Measures: Metric
|Legal and Tax: British Oriented
|VAT: 5% (Introduced Jan. 1994)
||Lagos: Murtal Muhammed Airport
|Dailing Codes: - in code (Outside)234
||Abuja: Nnamdi Azikiwe Intl.Airport
|Dailing Code: - out code 009
||Port Harcourt: Port Harcourt Intl. Airport
||Kano: Kano International Airport
1862 (January 1): Lagos
Island annexed as a colony of Britain
Mr. H.S Freeman became Governor of Lagos Colony (Jan.
Rivers Protectorate renamed Niger Coast Protectorate
with Calabar as capital.
1890's: British reporter Flora Shaw, who later married Lord Frederick Lugard,
suggests that the country be named "Nigeria" after the Niger
1897: The British overthrew Oba Ovonramwen of Benin,
one of the last independent West African kings.
1900: The Niger Coast Protectorate, merged with the colony and protectorate
of Lagos, was renamed the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria
Lord Fredrick Lugard
1914: The northern and southern protectorates were amalgamated to form
Nigeria. Colonial officer Frederick Lugard was governor-general.
1929 (October): Women in the eastern commercial city of Aba held a rowdy
but effective and victorious protest against high taxes and low prices
of Nigerian exports.
1951: The British decided to grant Nigeria internal self-rule, following
an agitation led by the NCNC, Dr Azikiwe’s political party.
1954: The position of Governor was created in the three regions (North,
West and East) on the adoption of federalism.
1958: Nigerian Armed Forces transferred to Federal control. The Nigerian
Navy was born.
1959: The new Nigerian currency, the Pound, was introduced
1959: Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) and Niger Delta Congress (NDC) formed
an alliance to contest parliamentary elections.
1960 (October 1): Independence. Dr.
Nnamdi Azikiwe became Nigeria’s first indigenous
1960-1966: First Republic of Nigeria under a British parliamentary system.
Abubakar Tafawa Balewa was elected Prime Minister.
1960: Nigeria's joined with Liberia and Togo in the "Monrovia Group",
seeking some form of a confederation of African states.
1961 (February 11 and 12): After a plebiscite, the Northern Cameroon, which
before then was administered separately within Nigeria, voted to join Nigeria.
But Southern Cameroon became part of francophone Cameroon.
1961 (June 1): Northern Cameroon became Sardauna Province of Nigeria, the
thirteenth province of Northern Nigeria as the country’s map assumed a
1961 (October 1): Southern Cameroon ceased to be a part of Nigeria.
1962:Following a split in the leadership of the AG that led to a crisis
in the Western Region, a state of emergency was declared in the region,
and the federal government invoked its emergency powers to administer the
region directly. Consequently the AG was toppled as regional power. Awolowo,
its leader, and other AG leaders, were convicted of treasonable felony.
Awolowo's former deputy and premier of the Western Region formed a new
party--the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP)--that took over the
government. Meanwhile, the federal coalition government acted on the agitation
of minority non-Yoruba groups for a separate state to be excised from the
1963: Nigeria shed the bulk of its political affinity with the British
colonial power to become a Republic. Nnamdi Azikiwe became the first President.
Obafemi Awolowo leader of the Action Group (AG) became leader of the opposition.
The regional premiers were Ahmadu Bello (Northern Region, NPC), Samuel
Akintola (Western Region, AG), Michael Okpara (Eastern Region, NCNC). Dennis
Osadebey (NCNC) became premier of the Midwestern Region just created out
of the old Western region.
1964: Prime Minister Balewa’s Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) aligned with
a faction of the Action Group (AG) led by Chief Ladoke Akintola, the Nigerian
National Democratic Party (NNDP), to form the Nigerian National Alliance
(NNA) in readiness for the elections. At the same time, the main Action
Group led by Chief Obafemi Awolowo formed an alliance with the United Middle-Belt
Congress (UMBC) and Alhaji Aminu Kano's Northern Elements Progressive Union
(NEPU) and Borno Youth Movement to form the United Progressive Grand Alliance
1965 (November): Violence erupted in the western region, and criticism
of the political ruling class created unease in the new republic.
1966 (January 15): Junior officers of the Nigerian army, mostly majors
overthrew the government in a coup d’etat. The officers, most of whom were
Igbo, assassinated Balewa in Lagos, Akintola in Ibadan, and Bello in Kaduna,
as well as some senior northern officers. The coup leaders pledged to establish
a strong and efficient government committed to a progressive program and
eventually to new elections. They vowed to stop the post-electoral violence
and stamp out corruption that they said was rife in the civilian administration.
General Johnson T. Aguiyi-Ironsi, the most senior military officer, and
incidentally an easterner (Igbo), who stepped in to restore order, became
the head of state.
1966 (May 29): Massive rioting started in the major towns of Northern Nigeria
and attack the Igbos and other easterners to avenge the death of many senior
northerners in the coup.
1966 (July 29): A group of Northern officers and men stormed the Western
Region’s governor’s residence in Ibadan where General Aguiyi Ironsi was
staying with his host, Lt. Col Adekunle Fajuyi. Both the head of state
and governor are killed.
1966 (August 1): Lt. Col Yakubu Gowon a fairly junior officer from the
north became the new head of state.
1967 (January 4): Nigeria's military leaders travelled to Aburi in Ghana
to find a solution to problems facing the country and to avert an imminent
military clash between the north and the east.
1967 (May 30): Lt Col Ojukwu, governor of the east, declared his region
the Republic of Biafra.
1967 (July 6): First shots were fired heralding a 30-month war between
the Federal government and the rebel Republic of Biafra.
1970 (January 15): The civil war ended and reconstruction and rehabilitation
1971 (April 2): Nigeria switches with amazing smoothness from driving on
the left hand side (like Britain) to the left, like all its neighbouring
1973 (May): Gowon establishes the National Youth Service Corps Scheme and
introduces compulsory one-year service for all university graduates, to
promote integration and peace after the war.
1974: General Gowon said he could not keep his earlier promise to return
power to a democratically elected government in 1976. He announced an indefinite
postponement of a programme of transition to civil rule.
1975 (July): Gowon was overthrown in a coup, on the anniversary of his
ninth year in office. Brigadier (later General) Murtala Mohammed, the new
head of state promised a 1979 restoration of democracy.
1976: The federal government adhering to the recommendations of a panel
earlier set up to advise it, approves the creation of a new Federal Capital
Territory, Abuja, away from Lagos.
1976 (February 13): Murtala Mohammed was killed in the traffic on his way
to work. But the coup executed by an easy-going physical education corps
Lt colonel, and heralded by a quixotic announcement on the radio, was botched.
1976 (February 14): General Mohammed is succeeded by General Olusegun Obasanjo
who pledged to pursue his predecessor’s transition programme.
1976 (September 2): The Universal Primary Education Scheme (UPE) was introduced,
making education free and compulsory in the country.
1977: Nigeria hosted FESTAC the festival of arts and culture drawing black
talent and civilization from around the world.
1979: Nigeria got a new constitution.
1979 (October 1): General Obasanjo handed over to Alhaji Shehu Shagari
as first elected executive President and the first politician to govern
Nigeria since 1966. Five parties had competed for the presidency, and Shagari
of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) was declared the winner. The other
parties were: Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), National People’s Party (UPN),
Great Nigeria People’s Party (GNPP), People’s Redemption Party (PRP)
1983: The conduct of the general elections was criticised by opposing parties
and the media. Violent erupted in some parts of the west.
1983(September): Shagari was re-elected president of Nigeria in August-September
1983(December 31): Following a coup d’etat, the military returned to power.
Major-General Muhammadu Buhari was named head of state.
1985 (August 27): Following accusations of callousness and overzealousness,
Buhari was overthrown in a palace coup. The army chief, General Ibrahim
Babangida took over power.
1986: The seat of government was officially moved from Lagos to Abuja
1993 (June 12): After several postponements by the military administration,
presidential elections were held. Businessman and newspaper publisher Moshood
Abiola of the SDP took unexpected lead in early returns.
1993 (June 23): Babangida on national television offered his reasons for
annulling the results of the Presidential election. At least 100 people
were killed in riots in the southwest, Abiola's home area.
1993 (August 26): Under severe opposition and pressure, Babangida resigned
as military president and appointed an interim government headed by Chief
Ernest A. Shonekan.
1993 (October): A ragtag group of young people under the name of Movement
for the Advancement of Democracy (MAD) hijacked a Nigerian airliner
to neighbouring Niger in order to protest official corruption. Nigerian
troops stormed liberated the plane at the N’djamena airport, Republic of
1993 (November 17): General Sani Abacha, defence minister in the interim
government and most senior officer, seized power from Shonekan, abolishes
1994: Abiola, who had escaped abroad after the annulment, returned and
proclaimed himself president. He was arrested and charged with treason.
1995 (July): Former head of state, Obasanjo was sentenced to 25 years in
prison by a secret military tribunal for alleged participation in an attempt
(widely believed to have been fictional) to overthrow the government.
1996 (May): Nnamdi Azikiwe, Nigeria's first president, died.
1998 (June 8): General Abacha died suddenly and mysteriously. The official
cause of death: heart attack. Nigerians swarmed the streets rejoicing.
1998 (June 9): Gen. Abdulsalaam Abubakar was named Nigeria's eighth military
ruler. He promised to restore civilian rule promptly.
1998: A month after General Abacha's death the United
Nations General-Secretary Kofi Annan arrived in Nigeria
to conclude deals for the release of Chief Abiola.
1998 (July 7): Abiola died in detention of a heart disease, a week after
Annan’s visit, before he could be released in a general amnesty for political
prisoners. Rioting in Lagos led to over 60 deaths.
1998 (July 20): Abubakar promised to relinquish power on May 29, 1999.
1999 (February 15): Former military ruler Obasanjo won the presidential
nomination of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP).
1999 (May): A new Constitution was adopted. It was based on the 1979 Constitution.
1999 (May 29): Former Military Head of State, Olusegun Obasanjo, was sworn
in as Nigeria's democratically elected civilian President.
Lugard And Colonial Nigeria – Towards An Identity?
This original article, titled “Lugard And Colonial Nigeria – Towards An
Identity?” was written by the great historian, Michael Crowder – History
Today, February 1986, Vol. 36, pp 23 – 29. I am again merely reproducing
this fine piece that throws more light on the feud and rivalry between
our colonial administrators and which seem to have been passed down to
us, and is the causative of most of the ethnic distrust and problems that
still exist in Nigeria today. I am sure many Nigerians, especially historians,
have read this article, but then, most of us who are not students of history
might not have come across it. Certainly, I had not, until quite recently,
and it was a fascinating read and knowledge. It is a long article, but
I hope you will take your time to read through and enjoy this part of our
Here we go:
like sovereign heads of state than servants of the same British Crown” –
the rivalry and ‘diplomacy’ of imperial proconsuls hampered the
creation of Nigeria between 1900 and 1914)
Lugard’s arrival at Calabar on a tour of the Central and Eastern Provinces, Dec. 1912
DIPLOMACY IS NOT AN ACTIVITY usually associated with colonies or colonial
officials. By definition colonies were not sovereign states and where relations
with other countries were concerned, these were conducted for them by their
imperial governments. Likewise, the colonial official did not ‘represent’
his country in his colony, even when he bore a diplomatic title like that
of ‘Resident’ in Northern Nigeria, but rather exercised power on its behalf
over people who had lost their sovereignty.
Given this, a special problem arose as to how to
conduct relations between colonies occupied by the same metropolitan
power that were territorially contiguous but administered as separate
entities. To take Africa as an example, Britain after the First World
war had nine contiguous colonies in East, Central and Southern Africa,
while France had seventeen in Northern, Western and Equatorial Africa.
How were conflicts of interest between neighbouring countries
administered by the same colonial power to be solved, or projects of
mutual economic interest to be advanced? The French partially solved
this problem by placing their West African colonies under a
Governor-General in Dakar, and their Equatorial African colonies under a
Governor-General in Brazzaville, thus reducing the potential areas of
inter-colonial conflict to those between the French Equatorial
Federation and the French West African Federation, and between the
latter and the French North African possessions of Morocco and Algeria,
with which it had common borders. The British, who delegated more power
to their proconsuls in Africa than did the French, expected them to
settle any disputes that might arise between them on the spot, keeping
the overworked and understaffed Colonial Office informed of results, but
only in the last resort referring to it for arbitration.
three contiguous British territories of the Niger – the Lagos Colony and
Protectorate, and the Protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria –
provide a fascinating case study of the way in which these contiguous
British administrations conducted relations with each other very much as
would friendly (and sometimes not so friendly) sovereign states with
particular concerns, boundaries and ways of life to defend. Before the
Protectorate of Northern Nigeria was formally proclaimed in 1900, it was
declared British policy to amalgamate it with its southern neighbours.
The fact it took fourteen years to amalgamate them, was in large part
due to often bitter ‘diplomatic’ wrangles between their respective
officials, and the way these officials perceived their colonies as
‘countries’ with special interests which it was their business to
protect. Sir Frederick Lugard, as High Commissioner of the Protectorate
of Northern Nigeria, highlighted the anomalies of this situation when he
wrote to Sir William MacGregor, Governor of the Lagos Colony and
Protectorate, over the boundary between the two British territories in
"I venture to remind Your Excellency that though,
in my opinion, it matters little where the exact frontier is placed,
since both Protectorates are British, since before long it is your hope
and mine that they will become still more closely connected, and since I
have the good fortune to have succeeded in working in co-operation and
harmony with Your Excellency, still I have an obligation no less than
that which you so strongly feel yourself to safeguard the traditional
and just rights of the chiefs within my administration".
three British colonial possessions of the Niger that were amalgamated
between 1906 and 1914 each had a different origin which helped determine
the specific character they quickly developed under their British
administrators. The oldest of the three was the Lagos Colony and
Protectorate, dating back to 1861 when the British occupied the
island-port of Lagos to put an end to its involvement in the slave trade
and to protect British commercial and evangelical interests in the
hinterland. The subsequent occupation of its hinterland was accomplished
in the last decade of the nineteenth century, mainly peacefully through
treaties with the kings of the Yoruba states who made up this largely
ethnically homogenous, though politically fragmented, territory. A
substantial group of Yoruba-speaking people were, however, included in
the Northern Protectorate since in the early nineteenth century they had
incorporated into Ilorin, one of the constituent emirates of the great
Sokoto Caliphate, whose lands comprised nearly two-thirds of that
Protectorate. A small group of Yoruba were to be found in the extreme
western areas of the Southern Nigerian Protectorate. Lagos island itself
and a small part of the mainland had the status of a Crown Colony with
its own Executive and Legislative Council established at the time of the
British occupation in 1861, while the larger hinterland was a British
Top Left: Sir William MacGregor, Governor of the Lagos Colony and Protectorate
Right: Sir Frederick Lugard, High Commissioner for the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria
Bottom Left: Sir Percy Girouard, Lugard’s successor in the North.
the east of the Lagos Colony and Protectorate lay the Protectorate of
Southern Nigeria, much of which in 1900 still had to be conquered or, in
British colonial parlance, ‘pacified’. This Protectorate, formed from
the old Niger Coast Protectorate and part of the lands of the Royal
Niger Company, whose status as a Charter Company with the right to
administer territory on behalf of the Crown had been withdrawn the year
before, comprised a multitude of different ethnic groups. Its origins
went back to the mid-nineteenth century when British consular officials
began to exercise authority over certain coastal states in an attempt to
suppress the slave trade and protect the interests of British palm-oil
merchants. It was ruled from Old Calabar in the far south-eastern corner
of the territory by Sir Ralph Moor.
The Protectorate of
Northern Nigeria, proclaimed on January 1st, 1900, when the British flag
was hoisted at Lokoja at the confluence of the Benue and the Niger, was
formed from lands claimed, and to a much lesser extent administered, by
the Royal Niger Company along the Niger and Benue river valleys and to
the north of them. Sir Frederick Lugard, who had earlier secured some of
these territories for the Company, now became the Protectorate’s
founding High Commissioner. As Margery Perham, his biographer wrote:
colonial governor can seldom have been appointed to a territory so much
of which had never even been viewed by himself or any other European".
may seem curious that so soon after their conquest, and given the
arbitrary nature of their boundaries and the heterogeneity of the
peoples and polities enclosed within them, these British-created
colonies could even be thought of in terms of countries. Yet, within a
short space of time, their respective colonial administrations had
imposed on them a separate, albeit British-derived identity, in terms of
differing legal systems, administrative organisation and patterns of
economic development. The administrators of these three territories saw
them as having the attributes of countries and, if they were to be
amalgamated, as all were agreed they eventually should, this should be
done on terms that were in no way disadvantageous to their individual
The actual decision to amalgamate the British
territories on the Niger had been taken as early as 1898 by a six member
Niger Committee. The Colonial Office was represented by the Earl of
Selbourne and Mr Reginald Antrobus; the Foreign Office, which was still
responsible for the Niger Coast Protectorate, by Sir Clement Hill; while
the Niger Territories themselves were represented by Sir Henry
McCallum, Governor of Lagos, Sir Ralph Moor, Consul-General of the Niger
Coast Protectorate, and Sir George Goldie, head of the Royal Niger
Company, part of whose territories were to make up the future
Protectorate of Northern Nigeria.
All were agreed that the long
term goal should be the amalgamation of the three territories. For the
present this was impractical because of lack of communications and the
problem of the climate which dictated the appointment of younger men as
senior administrators and would make it difficult to find a man with
sufficient seniority to oversee all three territories. At this early
stage, differences of opinion began to emerge between the British
officials on the spot as to what form the organisation should take. Moor
favoured the immediate amalgamation of Lagos and the Niger Coast
Protectorate under one administration as the Maritime Province.
McCallum, who had initially favoured the idea, subsequently formed the
‘decided opinion’ that it would be impossible under the present
conditions for one man to rule effectively over the whole of the
suggested Maritime Province. Antrobus agreed with McCallum that it would
be difficult to put the two southern administrations under one
government, ‘although if communications were easier there would no doubt
be advantages in doing so’.
Chamberlain, as Secretary of State
for Colonies, accepted that for the time being there should be three
territories, so in 1900, with the declaration of the British
protectorate of Northern Nigeria, the renaming of the Niger Coast
Protectorate as the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria and the retention
of the Lagos Colony and Protectorate as a separate administrative
entity, there were established three British administrations on the
Niger whose long-term goal was amalgamation. But as the Nigerian
historian and administrator, Isaac N Okonjo, so shrewdly observed:
for the last time were British political officers to identify
themselves too closely with the interests of the region of Nigeria in
which they served and which they had grown to love at the expense of the
wider interest of the country as a whole".
The principle source
of friction between the three territories on the Niger was the
demarcation of their boundaries with each other. Indeed sometimes
negotiations over these were more difficult of settlement than those
over their frontiers with their French and German neighbours. Certainly
the latter sets of boundaries were more speedily determined. Indeed some
stretches of boundary between the northern and southern protectorates
had not been fixed by the time of their amalgamation in 1914.
principal source of friction lay on the boundary between Northern
Nigeria on the one hand and the Lagos and Southern Protectorate on the
other. The acrimony that developed between MacGregor of Lagos and Lugard
of the North over the towns of Kishi and Saki underlines the fact that
these British officials acted as though they were representing separate
states, not colonies belonging to the same colonial power. Kishi and
Saki were Yoruba towns with which Lugard, when an official of the Royal
Niger Company, had made treaties. Now, as High Commissioner of Northern
Nigeria, which had inherited the northern territories of the RNC, he
considered these two towns properly belonged to him. Furthermore, he
considered these relatively populous towns essential as bases for the
opening-up of the less populous non-Yoruba country to their north, known
as Borgu, which was clearly part of his domain. MacGregor argued that
both Saki and Kishi traditionally paid allegiance to the Yoruba ruler of
Oyo, which clearly lay in his domain, and therefore, they should come
under his jurisdiction.
As early as April 1900, with Lugard’s
agreement, Macgregor set off on journeys into parts of Yorubaland
claimed by the North. Not only did MacGregor pass on to the Colonial
Office complaints made by Yoruba towns he claimed for Lagos about
‘forcible and harmful interference by officers of Northern Nigeria, of
whom our boundary natives stand in unreasonable and unreasoning dread’,
but he alleged that these border towns had also a ‘great dread of being
transferred to Northern Nigeria’. MacGregor also wrote that he
considered that he had already ‘shown that it is impossible for Lagos to
cede Kishi’ (The author’s italics).
Lugard, who considered
MacGregor over-solicitous of, and deferential to, his ‘native chiefs’.
Was particularly annoyed at the charges laid against his officers.
Indeed he wrote to MacGregor that apart from not feeling it necessary to
represent to the Secretary of state complaints against or adverse
reports upon Lagos officials: ‘….I deprecate allowing natives to
practice their traditional policy of playing off the officials of one
Administration against that of the other’. Even so, Lugard has
MacGregor’s charges investigated and one of the border officials, Pierce
M Dwyer, Assistant Resident in Ilorin, assured him ‘that during my
period of service in Illorin [sic] I have been most careful to refrain
from any act that might be considered by the Lagos Government as
The boundary disputes between Moor and Lugard were no less acrimonious.
The basic differences between the two were summed up by Captain Woodruffe,
one of the Southern Boundary Commissioners, who held that they:
"Arose from the fact that
from the Northern Nigerian point of view, geographical considerations
were of little or no importance….further….the Political Officer,
Northern Nigeria, stated that he did not see what race, Native Custom
and tradition had to do with the question as he, personally, did not
consider the natives had any feelings of sentiment or cling to customs
and laws they and the people before them were used to, and further, in
his opinion that if any natives were ordered by one Government or the
other to go either North of South they would do so".
Southern Boundary Commissioner, by contrast, considered that ‘natives
were very much in the habit of maintaining their old allegiance, however
Although Moor and Lugard signed an agreement with
regard to their boundary west of the Niger, they were unable to settle
that east of the Niger. They did, however, come to an understanding as
to what was for the time-being workable, and agreed joint patrols along
their undefined borders because the ‘natives’ in the area were not yet
‘pacified’. But the divisions between them were too deep. In the event
Lugard appealed to the Secretary of State for a ruling, talking about
the question of transfer of lands in terms of ‘cession’. Meanwhile he
assured Moor that he had not been ‘activated by hunger for land’.
were easier on the Lagos-Southern Nigerian Protectorate frontier. But
even though disputes concerned matters of much less moment, such as the
position of a marker point in a river, they were sometimes referred
home. As Bull minuted to Antrobus on Moor’s despatch about the markers:
"It is merely a question of words, and it is a little surprising that
a man of Sir R Moor’s capacity should have referred home on such a point,
when he has been told that Mr Chamberlain is prepared to agree to anything
he may settle with OAG (Officer Administering the Government) Lagos in
this matter. But these internal boundary questions, though trivial, have
a knack of bringing out the most businesslike characteristics of all three
administrators of Nigeria". While the objective of amalgamating the three Nigerian
territories had been established by the Niger Committee from the outset,
no time limit had been set for its achievement. The Committee did,
however, recommend that the three territories form a Customs Union
pending amalgamation, and Lugard, before assuming duties in the North,
had proposed in 1899 that he would adopt the same ‘customs, regulations
and management’ as Southern Nigeria and Lagos ‘in so far as they are
applicable to an inland territory’. But once out in Northern Nigeria,
Lugard established a customs policy of his own. Tolls were imposed on
goods entering the Northern Protectorate by road from the Southern
Protectorate, though goods shipped along the rivers Niger and Benue went
free. The African merchants of Lagos were particularly resentful of
these tolls and of their status as ‘aliens’ in Northern Nigeria. Indeed
by the terms of the Land Proclamation of 1900, no-one who was not a
native of the Northern Protectorate could directly or indirectly acquire
interest in and rights over land within the Protectorate from a
‘native’ without the consent, in writing, of the High Commissioner.
this did not mean that Lugard was against amalgamation, indeed, for
Lugard, ruling over the newest and largest of the three territories,
amalgamation was, curiously, the most urgent. In the first place,
Northern Nigeria was landlocked and could therefore; earn no direct
revenue from duties on imports or exports. Instead the Southern Nigeria
Protectorate made an annual grant of £34,000 in respect of the duties it
was estimated it would be able to raise if it had its own port; but the
Southern administration protested that effectively only £12,000 would
in reality have been raised on the volume of external trade emanating
from the North. In the second place much of the North was still outside
administrative control and Lugard required an Imperial Grant-in-Aide to
complete its conquest and establish his administration. This subjected
him to a degree of metropolitan control that the two Southern
Protectorates did not suffer. If he could amalgamate with a southern
territory with sufficient a surplus in its revenue to cover his deficit,
he would be relieved of irksome control by an Imperial Treasury that
held that all colonial dependencies should pay their own way. MacGregor
and Moor were equally anxious to amalgamate with the North so the
railway that they both planned to extend from their seaboard to the
interior could thus penetrate and open up their natural hinterlands
Map of Nigeria before amalgamation showing the three Protectorates and Provinces
(Akintokunbo Adejumo: Please note the Cameroon border and relate to Bakassi Province today)
far as the Colonial Office was concerned, the main stumbling block on
the road to amalgamation was ‘the personalities of the administrators of
the three provinces’. Nevertheless in 1903 a major step towards
amalgamation of the two coastal protectorates was taken when Sir Ralph
Moor was replaced by Sir Walter Egerton, who was appointed
simultaneously Governor of the Lagos Colony and Protectorate and of the
Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. Even so it took some three years to
bring the two territories together because Egerton seemed to take the
sides of both parties to the proposed union and wrote in 1905 to
Lyttleton at the Colonial Office that the future amalgamation of
Northern Nigeria and Southern Nigeria would be:
than that between Lagos and Southern Nigeria, for the different systems
of government, laws, and methods adopted in the latter two
administrations forbid a complete union for some time to come".
he proposed to the Colonial Office a form of amalgamation of Lagos and
Southern Nigeria that approximated to a confederation with separate
The two Southern protectorates were finally and,
at Colonial Office insistence, fully amalgamated on February 26th, 1906,
to become the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria with its
capital at Lagos. Meanwhile disputes between the Northern and Southern
Protectorates continued unabated particularly in matters of railway
policy and boundaries. Indeed these two areas of potential conflict
became inextricably bound up as the Lagos line began to cross the
frontier into Northern Nigeria.
Lugard’s successor, Sir Percy
Girouard, was first and foremost a railway engineer and administrator,
with experience in the Sudan, Egypt and South Africa. His appointment
was a temporary one and had been made with a view to bringing some
rationale into plans to join up the Lagos line with the Northern line.
the time he took up his appointment Girouard found that the two
Nigerias had rival railway projects. From the port of Lagos the Southern
Nigerian administration was building a 3’ 6” gauge line northwards to
the Niger at Jebba in Northern territory. Meanwhile Lugard had been
planning a 2’ 6” line from Kano to Baro on the Niger which would enable
him to ship produce without passing through Southern Nigerian territory
since under the terms of the Berlin Convention of 1885 the Niger was an
The Southern Nigerian Government did not
want its railway to be subject to Northern control even when it passed
through the latter’s territory. Egerton therefore urged that the area of
Northern Nigeria southwest of the Niger be transferred to his
administration. But Girouard would have none of this, being as
protective of Northern interests as his predecessor (Lugard). Almost as
if to add insult to injury, the Colonial Office ruled that the rich
Southern Protectorate should provide the deficit-ridden Northern
Protectorate with the funds to finance its Baro line, since in any case
the two protectorates were destined shortly to be amalgamated. But he
did gain two major concessions: there was to be no hold-up in the
construction of his own line to meet up with the Northern line near
Zungeru, the northern capital, and more important still, the Northern
line should be of similar gauge to his own so there would be no
difficulty in transferring good from one line to the other. Otherwise
had the Northern line remained at 2’ 6” gauge, it would have favoured
onward carriage of northern goods from Zungeru to Baro rather than Lagos
even at the time of the year when only shallow draft steamers could
operate on the Niger. But Egerton was to lose his other argument that at
least he should have control of the land on either side of his railway
as it passed through Northern territory.
Right up to the eve of
amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectorates wrangles between
their respective administrations over control of the northern sector of
the Lagos line continued with the North accusing the South of refusing
to book goods bound for Jebba and shipment down the Niger and the South
accusing the North of giving preferential treatment to those who chose
to export goods via Baro and the Niger rather than through Lagos.
Construction of the Kano-Lagos railway in progress near Kaduna in 1910
from the major territorial claim made by Egerton to the Kabba and
Ilorin provinces, disputes over the demarcation of the existing boundary
between the North and the South continued. However, they never reached
the acrimony that had existed between Lugard and MacGregor, and then his
successor Egerton, which culminated in Lugard writing to the Under
Secretary of State for Colonies when he was on leave in Abinger before
taking up his post in Hong Kong:
If Sir Walter Egerton intends
forthwith to carry out his own view [with regard to the frontier] and
will send his own officer to lay out a line in accordance with them [it
will compel] the Government of Northern Nigeria to oppose such a course
of action by force or refer the matter to the Secretary of State for a
The most bitter dispute was along the boundary
eastward from the Niger to the border with German Kamerun. Once again we
see that the administrations of the two Protectorates had come to
regard themselves as representing separate countries with distinct
identities. One sector of the boundary divided the Tiv people, one of
Nigeria’s largest ‘minority’ groups. Girouard urged that the whole of
Tiv country should be brought under his administration. To this Egerton
replied that, since they were a ‘pagan’ people, ‘very similar to other
pagan races in Southern Nigeria’, the reverse should be the case.
‘Southern Nigeria Officers have infinitely greater experience in the
treatment of the Pagan peoples, in their habits and methods of
government than Northern Nigeria officials …’ In urging the Colonial
Office to transfer Tiv country to Southern Nigeria he added a number of
other claims, notably Ilorin:
"Sir Percy Girouard and myself,
however, hold very opposite views regarding the development of Northern
Nigeria. Sir Percy is content to develop the country without assistance
from outside and demurs to the entry of Southern Nigeria natives. I, on
the other hand, think that equilibrium between revenue and expenditure
can be best effected by encouraging intercourse between the North and
At this time, the Tiv were still resisting the
imposition of British rule. Since they were divided between the two
administrations both were engaged in ‘punitive expeditions’ against
them. Here Egerton stipulated that he did not wish Southern Nigeria
troops to be involved in operations in Northern Tivland. Tiredly, Bull
in the Colonial Office minuted to a colleague: ‘As one expected, he
(Egerton) is very jealous of the boundary between Southern and Northern
Particularly galling to Egerton and his Southern
Nigerian subjects were the taxes that continued to be imposed on them
when trading in the Northern Protectorate. They resented being treated
as though they were foreigners there. Their alien status in that
territory was re-emphasised in 1910 by the Land and Native Rights
Proclamation which gave the Northern administration control over
immigration from the south by with-holding the grant of a certificate of
occupancy or by attaching restrictive conditions to a grant, or by
threatening to revoke it.
In the Colonial Office the principle
of eventual amalgamation had never been in question: the real problem
was to find the man capable of undertaking it. The matter had achieved
an urgency in recent years because of what Okonjo has called, somewhat
melodramatically, the collapse of the Southern Nigerian Administration
in the face of activities of lawyers. Egerton put the position as seen
by his administration succinctly in a letter to Lord Crewe, the Colonial
Secretary. Although the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court extended
throughout the Southern Protectorate he considered that its most
backward parts were:
"Quite unfitted for so highly organised
jurisdiction, little inconvenience and liaison resulted from its
introduction until the advent within the last few years of native
barristers from Sierra Leone and the Gold Coast who have adopted the
habit of sending their agents through the country touting for cases and
inducing towns, which before the advent of civil control, would have
fought over matters, to pay them extortionate fees to bring suits in the
Supreme Court…..Naked savages are now, through the agency of lawyers,
bringing cases before the Supreme Court."
These lawyers, Okonjo
convincingly argues, succeeded in hamstringing the administration to
such an extent that in places it came to a standstill. The Northern
Nigerian Government had taken powers from the beginning to exclude
barristers from the Provincial Courts of the Protectorate. Thus, when
Lugard, coming to the end of his term as Governor of Hong Kong in 1911,
indicated that he would be willing to undertake the task of amalgamating
the two Nigerias, he seemed the ideal choice. Matured by years, and
with direct experience of administering Northern Nigeria, which he had
done so much to build and which ran so smoothly compared with the
disarray in which its southern counterpart found itself, he appeared to
be as likely as anyone to be able to join the two parts into an
The consequences for Nigeria’s long-term
political development of the formula Lugard chose need not concern us
here except in two respects. The first is that not surprisingly Lugard’s
amalgamation largely involved imposing on Southern Nigeria the
administrative and judicial systems of the North. The second was that
the amalgamation was only a partial one. Whereas the Colonial Office has
overruled Egerton’s scheme for partial amalgamation of the two southern
territories in 1906, they allowed Lugard’s scheme to go ahead. He
received a number of suggestions as to how the huge Northern
Protectorate might be broken up to give the constituent units of the new
Nigeria greater balance. But Lugard had created Northern Nigeria and he
was clearly not prepared to see his ‘country’ lose its identity. The
farthest he was prepared to go was to suggest a return to the pre-1906
situation by re-establishing the former Lagos Colony and Protectorate as
a separate constituent unit of amalgamated Nigeria.
As it was,
Lugard’s amalgamation was more like a loose federation of two countries,
each of which retained its own administration, headed by a
Lieutenant-Governor with his own Secretariat, budget and departments.
Only Posts and Telegraphs, Survey, Audit, Judiciary and Military were
centralised under Lugard as Governor-General. Southerners continued to
be treated as aliens in the north. The consequences of this partial
amalgamation were to haunt Nigeria for the next fifty years and many
would argue that the Nigerian civil war had its roots in the form of
amalgamation Lugard imposed on the country.
* * *
amalgamation of the three British territories on the Niger, agreed in
principle in 1898, took nearly sixteen years to achieve because the
administrators of these territories often behaved more like sovereign
heads of state than servants of the same British Crown. They and their
subordinate officials conducted relations with each other as though they
were dealing with foreign governments rather than neighbouring British
administrations whose frontiers had been largely arbitrarily delimited
and were soon to be joined together as one unit.
From a rational
point of view these frontiers should have been of as little
consequences as those between British counties. As it was the most
disputes between the three administrators on the Niger were over
borders, the very stuff of diplomacy. Rational economic co-operation
between them was bedevilled not by irredentism on the part of the
inhabitants who had been unwillingly enclosed by the colonial frontiers,
but of their colonial overloads. British officials identified fiercely
with the colonies they had been sent out to govern and serve in, as
fiercely as they had with their public schools or universities. Thus
Sylvia Leith-Ross, sailing out to Nigeria for the first time in 1907
with her husband who was the Chief Transport Officer in the Northern
Protectorate, was surprised to find that the Purser would never dream of
placing Northern and Southern officials at the same table. The
‘Northerners’ looked down on the ‘Southerners’ who they considered
flabby and who began drinking at 6pm, whereas they did not start until
What is so remarkable about these ‘national identities’
is that they took root so quickly, feeding of course on existing ethnic
and religious differences, and were used as we have seen to defend one
British territory against encroachment – territorial or economic – by
the other, even though they were soon to be joined together. By giving
so much autonomy to their proconsuls, the British Colonial Office made
amalgamation most difficult of realisation and brought about a situation
in which in their conduct of relations with each other, they were bound
to act more like heads of state than civil servants of the same
government department – which of course, they were.
The doctor starting his morning rounds by railroad, Ilorin, October 1912
FOR FURTHER READING:
article is based primarily on the relevant papers of the Colonial
Office held in the Public Records Office at Kew. Margery Perham, Lugard:
The Years of Authority 1899-1945 (Collins, 1960); Isaac M Okonjo,
Administration in Nigeria 1900-1950 (New York, 1974); T K Tamuno, The
Evolution of the Nigerian State: The Southern Phase, 1898-1914 (Longman,
1972); Robert Heussler, The British in Northern Nigeria (Oxford
University Press, 1968); A.H.M. Kirk-Greene ed., Lugard and the
Amalgamation of Nigeria: a documentary record, London, 1968.
This article is reproduced from Lugard And Colonial Nigeria – Towards An Identity?
By Michael Crowder – History Today, February 1986, Vol. 36, pp 23 – 29
Michael Crowder was born in London on 9 June 1934 and educated at Mill
Hill School. During his national service he was seconded to the Nigeria
Regiment (1953-1954). He gained a 1st class honours degree in Politics,
Philosophy and Economics (PPE) at Hertford College, Oxford University in
1957. He returned to Lagos to become first Editor of Nigeria Magazine,
1959-1962, and then Secretary at the Institute of African Studies at the
University of Ibadan. In 1964-1965 he was Visiting Lecturer in African
History at the University of California, Berkeley, and in 1965-1967 was
Director of the Institute of African Studies at Fourah Bay College, University
of Sierra Leone.
From 1968 to 1978 he was based in
Nigeria again, first as Research Professor and Director of the Institute
of African Studies at the University of Ife, then from 1971 as
Professor of History at the Ahmadu Bello University (also becoming
Director of its Centre for Nigerian Cultural Studies, 1972-1975) and
finally as Research Professor in History at the Centre for Cultural
Studies at the University of Lagos, 1975-1978. He returned to London in
1979 to become editor of the British magazine History Today and is
credited with making a significant contribution to the survival and then
success of the magazine as it now is. He remained a Consultant Editor
up to his death.
He returned to the academic world as Visiting
Fellow at the Centre for International Studies at the LSE, 1981-82, and
then as Professor of History at the University of Botswana, 1982-85.
From 1985 until his death he was Joint Editor of the Journal of African
History. In 1986 he became Visiting Professor in Black Studies at
Amherst College, Massachusetts, USA and Honorary Professorial Fellow and
General Editor of the British Documents on the End of Empire Project at
the Institute of Commonwealth Studies (ICS). His death on 14 August
1988 was marked by obituaries in the four major daily London newspapers
and in many academic journals.
For a bibliography
[incomplete] of Crowder's works, see J.F. Ade Ajayi & John D.Y. Peel
(eds.), People and Empires in African History: Essays in Memory of
Michael Crowder (London, Longman 1992) pp.x-xiv. His major publications
include: The Story of Nigeria (1962, 4ed. 1977); West Africa under
Colonial Rule (London, Hutchinson 1968); jt.ed., The History of West
Africa (London, Longman 2 vols 1971-74, 2 ed. 1985-87); West African
Resistance (London, Hutchinson 1971); Nigeria: an Introduction to its
History (London, Longman 1979); ed. Cambridge History of Africa, vol.
VIII (CUP 1984);'I want to be taught how to govern, not to be taught how
to be governed': Tshekedi Khama and the opposition to the British
administration in the Bechuanaland Protectorate, 1926-30 (University of
Malawi 1984); The Flogging of Phinehas McIntosh: a tale of colonial
folly and injustice - Bechuanaland, 1933 (New Haven, Yale University
Press 1988); with N. Parsons, eds., Monarch of All I Survey:
Bechuanaland Diaries, 1929-37 by Sir Charles Rey (Gaborone and New York